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I. INTRODUCTION
This Year in Review is intended to provide practicing attorneys
with a practical guide to every decision published by the Alaska
Supreme Court in 1988. Clearly, due to the sheer volume of cases,
space will not permit a thorough discussion and critique of each deci-
sion. Rather, we have attempted to highlight those decisions which
represent a departure from prior law or resolve issues of first impres-
sion. Other cases are necessarily discussed in a more cursory fashion.
For easy reference, the opinions have been grouped alphabetically
according to the general subject matter of their holding rather than the
nature of the underlying claim. There are twelve categories: adminis-
trative law, Alaska Native law, business law, constitutional law, crimi-
nal law, employment law, family law, fish and game law, procedure,
property, tax law, and torts. Within each of these categories, to the
extent practicable, the cases have been subdivided according to more
specific legal areas.
Please note that while we attempt to provide a thorough picture
of the state of the law in a particular field at the time of the court's
decisions, it is possible that some holdings may have become partially
obsolete by the date of this note's publication due to subsequent rul-
ings or legislative action. The primary purpose of this note is to in-
form the practitioner which cases were decided in 1988, which
substantive areas of law were addressed, which statutes or prior com-
mon law principles were interpreted, and what the essence of the hold-
ings was. Attorneys are advised not to use the information contained
in this note without further reference to the cases cited.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The area of administrative law was a rather busy one for the court
in 1988. The court decided numerous cases challenging agency ac-
tions or regulations on a variety of procedural, statutory, and constitu-
tional grounds. While these cases primarily involve issues of
administrative law, they also have ramifications in other fields, includ-
ing business and constitutional law. The general trend in this area has
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been for the court to show deference to the state's rule making author-
ity except in cases of extreme constitutional infirmity.
A case which involved such constitutional infirmity was McAl-
pine v. University ofAlaska, 1 a controversy arising from the lieutenant
governor's attempt to place a resolution on the ballot for the 1988
general election. The resolution called for the establishment of a sepa-
rate community college system which would require the University to
transfer some of its property to the new system.2 Because such appro-
priations may not be effected by means of an initiative, the University
challenged the resolution. 3 This action is an appeal from the lower
court's judgment, removing the initiative from the ballot.4
In reaching its decision to allow the initiative to remain on the
ballot without the sentence which, in the court's opinion, effected the
appropriation, the court analyzed three primary issues.
First, the court held that the University's suit was not barred by
the relevant statute of limitations.5 Overturning its ruling in Boucher
v. Engstrom, 6 the court held that the thirty-day statute of limitations
does not apply solely to the members of an initiative committee;
rather, it applies to anyone seeking to challenge the lieutenant gover-
nor's decision regarding the initiative. However, the court refused to
apply this new rule retroactively to McAlpine.7 Therefore, the suit was
not barred.
Second, the court rejected all of the lieutenant governor's argu-
ments and ruled that the initiative would constitute an impermissible
appropriation. The court's ruling was an attempt to "ensure that the
legislature, and only the legislature, retains control over the allocation
of state assets among competing needs." 8
The third part of the court's analysis involved defining a court's
duties when faced with an initiative which is constitutionally infirm.
The court concluded, by analogy to statutory severability, that it is
within the court's power to sever the initiative and allow the constitu-
tionally sound portion to remain on the ballot.9 This is precisely the
1. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
2. Id. at 83.
3. Id. at 84.
4. Id. at 82.
5. Id. at 86. Section 15.45.240 of the Alaska Statutes provides for a thirty-day
statute of limitations for actions brought to have the determination by a lieutenant
governor reviewed. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (1988).
6. 528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974), overruled by McAlpine v. University of Alaska,
762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
7. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 86.
8. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 94.
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remedy this court fashioned after finding that the initiative satisfied
the court's three-prong test for severability.' 0
In Citizens for the Preservation of the Kenai River v. Sheffield,1'
the Citizens for the Preservation of the Kenai River ("CPKR") chal-
lenged the validity of a Department of Natural Resources regulation
prohibiting boats with engines stronger than thirty-five horsepower
from travelling on the Kenai River. The supreme court upheld the
regulation's validity, stating that (1) the burden of proving the invalid-
ity of the regulation properly fell on plaintiffs, (2) the regulation was
"consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry out the legisla-
ture's purposes," and (3) despite the fact that the defendant prevailed,
the court could not award attorneys' fees against CPKR 12 since it was
a public interest litigant satisfying the four-part test of Alaska Survival
v. State, Department of Natural Resources. 13
The court addressed the issue of discrimination in enforcement of
regulations in Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair Services v. State, De-
partment of Transportation. 14 In this case, the court held, inter alia,
that the Department of Transportation ("DOT") had discriminatorily
enforced regulations imposing insurance and permit requirements so
as to violate equal protection guarantees of the Alaska Constitution.
15
Specifically, the DOT had been requiring lessees of land at Anchorage
International Airport to incur regulatory costs for permits and insur-
ance while exempting itinerant merchants from such requirements. In
applying an equal protection analysis to this situation, the court em-
ployed the "'"uniform balancing" test which place[s] a greater or
lesser burden on the state to justify a classification depending on the
10. The court ruled that an impermissible portion should be severed when:
(1) standing alone, the remainder of the proposed bill can be given legal
effect; (2) deleting the impermissible portion would not substantially change
the spirit of the measure; and (3) it is evident from the content of the mea-
sure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the sponsors and
subscribers would prefer the measure to stand as altered, rather than to be
invalidated in its entirety.
Id. at 94-95 (footnote omitted).
11. 758 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1988).
12. Id. at 625-27.
13. 723 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1986). The four-point test is as follows:
(1) whether a case is designed to effectuate strong public policies;
(2) whether, if the plaintiff succeeds, numerous people will benefit from the
lawsuit; (3) whether only a private party could be expected to bring the suit;
and (4) whether the litigant claiming public interest status would lack suffi-
cient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit if it did not involve issues of
general importance.
Id. at 1292 (quoting Oceanview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Quadrant Constr. and
Eng'g, 680 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 1982)).
14. 754 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1988).
15. Id. at 1116; ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, § 1.
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importance of the individual right involved.' 16 The court character-
ized the case at bar as involving an economic interest, which is subject
to the "lowest level of scrutiny." 17 Therefore, the court noted that the
state need only show a rational basis for its actions.18 Even in the face
of this fairly liberal standard, the statute failed to meet its burden and
the court consequently ordered injunctive relief against the DOT. 19
In Homer Electric Association, Inc. v. Alaska Public Utilities Com-
mission,20 the supreme court upheld an Alaska Public Utilities Com-
mission ("APUC") ruling that prohibited electric companies from
including lobbying expenses in the total cost figure used to determine
rates charged to their customers. 21 Several other APUC actions were
also at issue, the most notable being APUC's allocation to Homer of
one hundred percent of the costs of the APUC proceedings. 22 APUC
argued that Homer should be assessed one hundred percent of the
costs because it not only initiated the proceeding but also would be
able to pass the costs through to its customers. 23 However, the court
agreed with Homer's arguments, finding that these grounds were in-
sufficient by themselves to justify the allocation, and remanded to have
APUC make further findings as to the propriety of the one hundred
percent cost allocation. 24 The court argued further that since the two
factors mentioned above are present in virtually every APUC hearing,'
"[t]o allow the APUC to base its findings as to its own liability upon
such superficial and recurring grounds would be tantamount to inter-
preting the statute to read that 'the commission may allocate costs
among the parties excluding the commission.' "25 The court found this
to be inconsistent with the legislative intent to allocate costs among
the parties, including the commission. 26
Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage27 involved a suit
challenging the city's revocation of building permits for several of the
plaintiff's apartment buildings. In affirming the judgment below in
favor of the defendant, the court adopted a different reasoning, hold-
ing that the plaintiff had waived its right to sue in court because it had
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies such as an appeal
16. Id. at 1114 (quoting Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264,
269 (Alaska 1984) (citing State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978))).
17. Id. at 1114.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1116.
20. 756 P.2d 874 (Alaska 1988).
21. Id. at 878.
22. Id. at 380-81.
23. Id. at 880.
24. Id. at 881.
25. Id. at 880-81 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 881.
27. 761 P.2d 119 (Alaska 1988).
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to the very zoning board that revoked the permits.28 By failing to
exhaust all administrative remedies, the plaintiff had deprived the mu-
nicipality of the chance to correct its own errors, thereby giving rise to
this suit. The court argued that had the plaintiff pursued these reme-
dies, it could have avoided this litigation.29
In VECO International, Inc. v. Alaska Public Offices Commis-
sion,30 the court upheld as constitutional the portion of the Alaska
Campaign Disclosure Act that requires certain groups to register with
the Alaska Public Offices Commission before making a campaign con-
tribution and to file periodic reports concerning its contributions.31
VECO, who had been fined for failure to comply with the Act, raised
ten issues on appeal.32 The court agreed with VECO that (1) the com-
mission should be partially estopped from acting against VECO since
some of VECO's activities were in reliance on commission opinions,
(2) a "statement of reasons" regarding penalties should have been pro-
vided VECO as required by statute, and (3) further accrual of fines
during the administrative appeal process was improper. 33 However,
the court rejected VECO's arguments on all other issues and re-
manded to the commission for reassessment of fines in accordance
with its holdings.34
28. Id. at 122.
29. Id.
30. 753 P.2d 703 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 298 (1988).
31. Id. at 707; ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.13.040(b), (c), (d), (e), 15.13.050,
15.13.130(4) (1988).
32. VECO, 753 P.2d at 707. The ten issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1. The superior court erred in giving retroactive effect to the Com-
mission's regulations.
2. VECO did not form a group with its employees as defined by AS
15.13.130(4).
3. The Commission is estopped from finding that the VECO with-
holding plan constituted group activity.
4. The Alaska Campaign Disclosure Act is unconstitutionally over-
broad.
5. The Act is unconstitutionally vague.
6. The Act violates the right to privacy.
7. The Commission abused its discretion in failing to give VECO no-
tice of delinquency.
8. The Commission erred in failing to make findings or state reasons
regarding the penalties it assessed.
9. The penalties assessed are excessive.
10. The accrual of penalties during appeal is unconstitutional.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 719.
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The court rejected the argument that VECO's fundraising activi-
ties did not constitute "joint action" for purposes of the statute.35 Spe-
cifically, the court held that "[w]hen two people or entities act jointly,
they cooperate or collaborate. One need not control the other. In this
context, joint action exists if the employer has a significant role in can-
didate selection."' 36
With regard to the remaining errors alleged by VECO, the court
concentrated primarily on those arguments involving the statute's al-
leged constitutional infirmities, including overbreadth, invasion of pri-
vacy, and vagueness. The court held that (1) the burden placed on
freedom of expression is outweighed by the need for an informed elec-
torate, reaffirming the court's position as expressed in Messerli v.
State,37 (2) VECO failed to brief the issue of its own right to privacy
and therefore lacked standing to raise this claim,38 and (3) the statu-
tory definitions were not unconstitutionally vague as analyzed under
the "fair notice" standard requiring that "[l]aws should give the ordi-
nary citizen fair notice of what is and what is not prohibited. '39
The court addressed the constitutionality of a portion of the Ex-
ecutive Budget Act4° in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. State. 41 In
this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of a provision which
allowed the governor to reduce appropriations to state agencies in ac-
cordance with revenue shortfalls.4 2 Affirming the superior court's
holding that this was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the court remanded for further consideration.4 3 As a result of
this decision, the governor's orders withholding expenditure authority
on funds earmarked for Fairbanks North Star Borough, among others,
were vacated, thus permitting disbursement of the funds.44 Prior to
the payment, however, the legislature "explicitly ratified and approved
all of the restrictions imposed by the governor, '45 thereby curing the
constitutional infirmity to the satisfaction of the superior court. Fair-
banks appealed again, and the supreme court again affirmed the lower
35. Id. at 708. Section 15.13.130(4) of the Alaska Statutes provides in pertinent
part that "'group' means... any combination of two or more persons or individuals
acting jointly who take action the major purpose of which is to influence the outcome
of an election ...." ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.130(4) (1988),
36. VECO, 753 P.2d at 708.
37. 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981).
38. VECO, 753 P.2d at 715.
39. Id. at '714.
40. ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080 (1988).
41. 753 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1988).
42. Id. at 1160-61; ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.080(g) (1988).
43. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 753 P.2d at 1159.
44. Id. (citing State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1144
(Alaska 1987)).
45. Id. at 1159.
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court's ruling in favor of the state, holding that as long as the legisla-
ture did not abdicate by giving the governor sweeping powers, and as
long as the legislature limited its authorization to specific appropria-
tions, there was no constitutional infirmity.46
In State v. Anderson,47 the court upheld regulations 48 that re-
quired land surveyors to have the Department of Environmental Con-
servation ("DEC") approve wastewater treatment and disposal
capability plans before (1) recordation of the final subdivision plat,49
and (2) sale by the surveyor of an interest in the subdivision.50 The
court entered judgment in favor of the state and held that the regula-
tions were reasonably necessary and consistent with the DEC's au-
thority to enforce its regulations. 51 The court based its holding on the
belief that, pursuant to its statutory obligation and grant of authority,
the DEC was fulfilling its duties in promulgating and enforcing regula-
tions regarding pollution and sanitation.5 2
The remaining two decisions in the field of administrative law are
largely confined to their facts. In Department of Community and Re-
gional Affairs v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, 5 3 the court ruled
that the Sisters of Providence were not entitled to state aid for hospital
construction as provided for in title 29, chapter 90, of the Alaska Stat-
utes.54 This statute was repealed in 1983 by legislation which con-
tained a grandfather clause providing that those "receiving or entitled
to receive" a subsidy prior to repeal would be able to continue doing
so.
5 5 The supreme court held that the sisters were not so "entitled,"
even though construction of their hospital had commenced prior to
repeal, because they had not submitted an application for funding
prior to the repeal date.56 The court explains its holding as sound
policy, particularly in light of the ambiguous and inconclusive legisla-
tive history of the Act.57
46. Id. at 1161.
47. 749 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1988).
48. Id. at 1347.
49. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 72.065(e) (Oct. 1987).
50. Id. tit. 18, § 72.065(f).
51. Anderson, 749 P.2d at 1347.
52. Id. at 1345.
53. 752 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1988).
54. Id. at 1017; ALASKA STAT. tit. 29, ch. 20, repealed by Act, ch. 95, § 10, 1983
Alaska Sess. Laws. For current law, see Temporary and Special Acts, ch. 95, § 9,
1983 Alaska Sess. Laws.
55. ALASKA STAT. tit. 29, ch. 20, repealed by Act, ch. 95, § 10, 1983 Alaska Sess.
Laws.
56. Sisters of Providence, 752 P.2d at 1017.
57. Id. at 1016.
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Finally, in Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities,58 the court held, in an abbrevi-
ated opinion, that a bidder whose contract was cancelled was entitled
to reimbursement for out-of-pocket mobilization costs.5 9 Finding that
the bidder had substantially complied with the requirement that docu-
mentation be submitted within thirty days by virtue of its having at-
tached such documentation to the administrative appeal, 6o the court
remanded for computation of these costs.
In In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 61 the only professional re-
sponsibility case before the court in 1988, the court addressed the con-
stitutionality of a statute that empowered the Commission on Judicial
Conduct to impose the sanction of public reprimand, 62 finding that it
exceeded the scope of power granted by the Alaska Constitution. 63
The court's interpretation of this statute included a comparison with
constitutions of other states, concluding that, although the statute is
"similar to other states' constitutions," the Alaska Constitution is
"more limited than either the Alaska Statute or other states' constitu-
tions." 4 The statute was therefore invalidated, and the commission is
now relegated to doing no more than recommending sanctions.65
III. ALASKA NATIVE LAW
While the court decided only three major cases dominated by
questions of Alaska Native law, it nevertheless addressed several im-
portant issues involving interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act. More important, though, was a decision involving na-
tive villages and their rights to sovereign immunity.
The most significant case involving Alaska Native law during1988 was Native Village of Stevens v. A.MP. 66 In Stevens, a case evolv-
ing from a contract dispute, a sharply divided court held that the Na-
tive Village of Stevens may not claim sovereign immunity from suit
because it is not a sovereign entity.67 This decision was controversial
because it appeared to be at odds with the federal district court's hold-
ing in Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett68 that Tyonek does possess
58. 765 P.2d 1360 (Alaska 1988).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 762 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1988).
62. ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.001(d)(3) (1988).
63. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10.
64. Inquiy Concerning a Judge, 762 P.2d at 1295 (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 1296.
66. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
67. Id. at 34.
68. Civil No. A-82-369 (D. Alaska 1982), appeal filed, No. 87-3587 (9th Cir.
1987)
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sovereign immunity. However, Tyonek was based upon that tribe's
"unique history."' 69 In Stevens, the court's decision was based upon its
interpretation of congressional intent "that most Alaskan native
groups not be treated as sovereigns," 70 as well as prior Alaska
Supreme Court opinions such as Atkinson v. Haldane,71 and
Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan.72
The court suggested certain factors which could permit a village
to be granted immunity.73 For example, immunity might be proper if
a Native group achieves tribal status74 or attains self-governing sta-
tus 75 under the Indian Reorganization Act. 76 The court noted, how-
ever, that no tribal recognition had been conferred upon the Native
Village of Stevens and that passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act ("ANCSA") 77 "evidences Congress's intent that non-reser-
vation villages be largely subject to state laws."'78 Justice Rabinowitz'
strongly worded dissent provides contrary arguments, focusing pri-
marily on the view that "Congress has never stated with sufficient clar-
ity an intent to waive the sovereign immunity of Alaska Native
villages." '79
The court also decided two cases which involved application of
ANCSA.80 In Hakala v. Atxam,81 the court interpreted section
14(c)(1) of ANCSA, which provides that a village corporation is re-
quired to reconvey any land received under patent from the federal
government to its current occupant (as of December 18, 1971), if the
land is being used as, inter alia, a "primary place of business. '8 2
Hakala and his partner occupied certain land as a base camp for their
hunting guide operation and therefore sought to have the corporation
convey this land to them under the Act. Finding that the campsite
was the nucleus, "or center of activity," of the guide business and, as
69. Stevens, 757 P.2d at 36.
70. Id. at 34.
71. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) (holding that the Metlakatla Indians possessed
tribal sovereign immunity).
72. 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), rev'd in part, 369 U.S. 45 (1962) (Alaska
Supreme Court held that regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior were inva-
lid as applied to the Indian Communities of Metlakatla, Kake, and Angoon. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision with regard to Metlakatla and
affirmed with regard to the other two villages).
73. Stevens, 757 P.2d at 40.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id. at 40.
76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-492 (1982 & U.S.C.A. Supp. 1989).
77. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
78. Stevens, 757 P.2d at 41.
79. Id. at 43 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
80. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
81. 753 P.2d 1144 (Alaska 1988).
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(1) (1982).
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such, satisfied the court's test for "primary place of business," the
supreme court reversed the lower court's decision.8 3 The interpreta-
tion of "primary place of business" was a matter of first impression by
the court, which noted that the legislative history provided no gui-
dance and that there was no case law interpreting section 14(c)(1) of
ANCSA.84
The court was faced with another ANCSA question in Tetlin Na-
tive Corp. v. State, 8 5 where it discussed the validity of five material site
easements granted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") to the
state after the land was conveyed to Tetlin Native Corporation under
ANCSA.86 Although the conveyance had deleted reference to the
easements, the court found that the state had not waived its right to
claim an interest in the easements despite a clause in the conveyance
requiring that any party with an alleged property interest appeal in
order to preserve its claim.87 Whether the sites were deleted through
inadvertence or assumed adjudication and cancellation is of no conse-
quence.88 The court also held that Tetlin was estopped to deny the
validity of the easements as validly created rights of way. 89 Placing
Tetlin in the shoes of the government, the court found that (1) the
BIA and Bureau of Land Management knew the facts, (2) they in-
tended their conduct to be acted upon, (3) the state was ignorant of the
"true" facts, (4) the state relied upon the actions of the BIA and BLM,
and (5) the government, in denying and granting easements, engaged
in affirmative conduct.90
IV. BUSINESS LAW
The court decided a great many cases this past year in the area of
business law. The decisions fall into four categories: insurance, se-
cured transactions, contracts, and general business.
A. Insurance
Litigation involving insurance companies is typically fact specific
and frequently results in holdings limited to the terms of the particular
83. Hakala, 753 P.2d at 1149.
84. Id. at 1147.
85. 759 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1988).
86. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
87. Tetlin, 759 P.2d at 533.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 537. Even if adjudication were the basis for deletion, neither notice nor
a hearing occurred to render a cancellation valid. Id.
90. Id. at 535-36.
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policy.91 The issues addressed by the court this year relate primarily
to statutes of limitation, coverage, defenses, and third party claims.
Any effective claim by an insured party or beneficiary under a
particular policy must be brought within the applicable statute of limi-
tations. For life insurance claims, the statutory period is six years af-
ter the death of the insured. 92 In Carman v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of America,93 the court addressed the tolling of the statutory period
when the insured has disappeared and the beneficiary relies on a statu-
tory presumption of death.94 The court held that the beneficiary's
cause of action accrues on the day that the presumptive death period
expires.95 For purposes of consistency, the court presumes that a de-
mand for payment was made and refused on that date in order to com-
mence the six-year statute on the insurance claim.96
With respect to coverage, the court generally views insurance pol-
icies as contracts and attempts to assign liability in accordance with
the terms of the policy.97 However, because insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion, the court also attempts to determine the reason-
able expectations of the parties and to honor the contract in order to
fulfill those expectations. 98 In so doing, the court resolves any ambi-
guities in the contract language in favor of the insured.99 In 1988, this
has resulted in the court's uniformly upholding the claims of the in-
sured party in construing the terms of the policy.
In Hillman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 1o the court
addressed the validity of uninsured motorist provisions that exclude
91. See, eg., State v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 755 P.2d 396 (Alaska
1988); Huber v. Insurance Co. of North America, 760 P.2d 1028 (Alaska 1988).
92. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050(1) (1983). Life insurance claims are subject to the
same period as actions on contracts. Carman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 748 P.2d 743,
745 (Alaska 1988).
93. 748 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1988).
94. Under Alaska Statutes section 13.06.035(3), a person who is absent for a con-
tinuous period of five years, and whose absence is unexplained, is presumed to have
died at the end of the five-year period. ALAsKA STAT. § 13.06.035(3) (1985 & Supp.
1988).
95. Carman, 748 P.2d at 744.
96. Id. at 745. Despite granting this liberal time period in which the beneficiary
may assert a claim, the court ruled against Mrs. Carman because she delayed unneces-
sarily even beyond the extended period during which the claim may permissibly be
filed.
97. Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Alaska
1988); State v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 755 P.2d 396, 400 (Alaska 1988). See
also infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
98. Hillman, 758 P.2d at 1250. See also Huber v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 760 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Alaska 1988), and infra notes 106-07 and accompany-
ing text.
99. Hillman, 758 P.2d at 1250.
100. 758 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1988).
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coverage when the insured is driving an owned but uninsured vehicle.
Recognizing that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to pro-
tect the insured party from harm at the hands of uninsured tortfeasors,
the court declared invalid the policy's exclusion for uninsured-owned
motor vehicles, stating that "[s]tatutory coverage bears no relationship
to the occupancy of any particular motor vehicle by the person
insured." 101
In State v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 102 a jet owned by Ja-
pan Airlines ("JAL") was damaged when it slid off an icy runway at
Anchorage International Airport. The court construed JAL's policy
indemnifying the state broadly, holding that the premises-operations
coverage applies to "all operations necessary or incidental"103 to the
course of standard business and is not narrowly confined to accidents
on the leased premises. 104 The court interpreted the cross-liabilities
contained in the policy to require that each claim be viewed as a sepa-
rate contract; therefore, an exclusion for aircraft owned by JAL did
not affect the state's recovery because the damaged aircraft was owned
by JAL and not by the state.105
The issue of whether an insurance company could be considered
the "owner" under a homeowner's contract with a building contractor
and therefore be required to comply with its terms was addressed in
Huber v. Insurance Co. of North America. 10 6 The court held that by
approving the proposal submitted by the contractor assenting to its
terms, the insurer became the "owner" and may therefore be obligated
to carry the fire insurance coverage specified in the proposal. 10 7
Coverage issues also include the amount a party may recover
under a particular policy, as addressed in Schultz v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co. 108 In cases where the parties to a dispute agree to a settlement
101. Id. at 1252. The court was interpreting Alaska Statutes section § 28.20.440,
which set forth the requirements of owner's liability insurance and prohibited unin-
sured-owned motor vehicle exclusions. ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440 (1984 & Supp.
1988) (originally enacted in 1966). The court adopted this interpretation despite the
passage of section 28.20.445(d) in 1984, which provided that uninsured motorist cov-
erage does not apply when the insured is occupying an owned but uninsured vehicle.
ALAsKA STAT. § 28.20.445(d) (1984). The accident at issue occurred in 1983 and
section 28.20.445(d) took effect on January 1, 1985. The court said that the 1984
statute could not be considered a mere clarification of section 28.20.440, and the plain-
tiff was permitted to recover under the law existing at the time of the accident. Hill-
man, 758 P.2d at 1252.
102. 755 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1988).
103. Id at 399 (quoting Hale v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 577, 580
(Alaska 1987)).
104. Id. at 399-400.
105. Id. at 4.00.
106. 760 P.2d 1028 (Alaska 1988).
107. Id. at 1029.
108. 754 P.2d 265 (Alaska 1988).
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and stipulate that the prevailing party will receive "policy limits," the
insured is entitled to recover the maximum face value of the policy
plus attorneys' fees based on a projected verdict award ifthe insurance
policy provides coverage for attorneys' fees and court costs.' 0 9 Thus,
the prevailing party is not penalized for early resolution of the dispute,
a result which benefits all parties, including the courts.
Several of the court's holdings concern defenses posed by insurers
to avoid paying claims. In Davis v. Criterion Insurance Co.,1 0 the
court addressed the issue of whether an insurance company, after de-
nying coverage for an accident, may be held liable in a suit to recover
damages when the insured failed to notify the insurer that she was
being sued. The court held that if an insurer unjustifiably denies cov-
erage, it terminates its rights to demand compliance with the other
terms of the insurance contract, including its right to be notified."'
The insurer therefore cannot claim as a defense to a default judgment
entered against it that the insured failed to provide the insurer with
notice of the suit.11 2
Another issue relating to defenses concerns the standard of proof
required for an insurance company to assert the defense successfully.
In Dairy Queen v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 113 the insurance company
refused to pay a fire insurance claim because the probable cause of the
fire was found to be arson. In affirming the lower court's ruling in
favor of the insurer," 4 the court held that for an insurance company
to assert arson and false swearing as a defense to paying a claim, it
need prove the defense only by a preponderance of the evidence and
not by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence." 5
While few decisions favored the insurance company over the in-
sured party, the court did limit the rights of third party claimants
against a tortfeasor's insurance company. For example, the court held
that an insurance policy with an indemnification clause does not flatly
require indemnification of all contractual obligations of the insured.
As discussed in Alaska National Insurance Co. v. Industrial Indemnity
109. Id. at 266-67.
110. 754 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1988).
111. Id. at 1332. The case was remanded to the lower court for a determination of
the validity of the denial of coverage.
112. Id.
113. 748 P.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Alaska 1988).
114. Id. at 1172.
115. Id.
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Co.,"16 the insured must first become legally obligated to pay dam-
ages.1 1 7 Therefore, if the insured is not made a party to the underlying
action, no judgment will establish the liability of its insurance com-
pany.11 8 Without any obligation on the part of the insured, there can
be no indemnification of a third party by the insurer.1 19
In O.K Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 120
the court, deciding an issue of first impression, held that a third party
claimant has no cause of action against an insurer for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing; this right runs only to the party
with whom the insurer has a fiduciary relationship, that is, the insured
party.1 21 The court further held that a third party claimant has no
cause of action under the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act
("UCSPA").122 In addition, a third party would have no claim as a
purchaser of goods and services for breach of warranty under the Con-
sumer Protection Act, 123 because the Act exempts from coverage all
activities regulated by the UCSPA. 124
B. Secured Transactions
The rules promulgated by the supreme court with respect to se-
cured transactions are fairly straightforward. Two cases decided on
the same day, Conrad v. Counsellors Investment Co. 125 and Moening v.
Alaska Mutual Bank 126 clarify the means by which secured creditors
may collect on the obligations owed them. In the event of a defaulted
payment, a secured creditor typically has the right either to sue on the
note or to foreclose on the secured property, unless the deed of trust
between the parties provides otherwise. 127 The court held in Conrad
that the fact that a deed of trust entitles the creditor to foreclose non-
judicially (sell the property and retain the proceeds in satisfaction of
the debt) does not imply that he cannot foreclose judicially (sue for a
deficiency judgment or a court-ordered foreclosure sale).' 28 However,
116. 757 P.2d 1052 (Alaska 1988).
117. Id. at 1054. In this case, the insurance policy specifically stated that "all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages.. ." were covered
by the indemnification clause. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988).
121. Id. at 526.
122. Id. at 527; ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (1984).
123. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471-.561 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
124. O.K Lumber Co., 759 P.2d at 528.
125. 751 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1988).
126. 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988).
127. Conrad, 751 P.2d at 12.
128. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988).
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Moening provided that a creditor who first elects a non-judicial fore-
closure does forfeit his rights to a later deficiency judgment, 129 while a
creditor who sues on the note and receives a deficiency judgment may
still foreclose the security either judicially or non-judicially if the judg-
ment remains unsatisfied. 130
The court also addressed the rights of junior lienholders in two
cases. In Adams v. FedAlaska Federal Credit Union, 131 the court ex-
amined the general proposition that a junior lienholder will lose his
security interest as a result of a senior lienholder's foreclosure sale,
even when the junior creditor is the purchaser at sale.132 The court
declined to adopt a rule that would allow the junior creditor to recover
from the debtor the difference between the value of the property
purchased and the outstanding indebtedness 133 and found that the loss
of the security interest permits the junior lienholder to obtain a writ of
attachment to the debtor's accounts to collect on the underlying
obligation.13 4
Dahlby v. Guzzardi 135 established that when a junior lienholder
pays the borrower's underlying debt owed to a senior creditor in order
to protect his own interest, he becomes subrogated to the rights of the
senior lienholder. 136 Therefore, the junior creditor, who then assumes
the senior lien, may collect the amount he paid in satisfaction of the
senior debt against the proceeds from a liquidation sale of the
security.137
The final matter in this section, while involving security interests,
does not concern secured transactions per se. In Fehir v. State, 138 the
court addressed the rights of an innocent, non-negligent security
holder of a vessel forfeited to the government for violations of fishing
law. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to a hearing under the
Alaska Constitution to obtain remission of the vessel or reimburse-
ment for his security interest. 139 The court held that while failure to
perfect a security interest in the vessel does not mandate forfeiture of
the right to a remission hearing, it first requires the holder to prove
129. Moening, 751 P.2d at 7-8; ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1985).
130. Conrad, 751 P.2d at 13; Moening, 751 P.2d at 8; ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.200
(1983).
131. 757 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 1988).
132. Id. at 1044; ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.090 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
133. Adams, 757 P.2d at 1043.
134. Id. at 1044. The dissent argued that this rule in fact "allows junior
lienholders to do indirectly that which would be prohibited if done directly." Id.
(Bryner, J., dissenting).
135. 763 P.2d 223 (Alaska 1988).
136. Id. at 226.
137. Id. at 227; ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.306(a), (b) (1986).
138. 755 P.2d 1107 (Alaska 1988).
139. Id. at 1108; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
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that he has an interest senior to that asserted by others, including the
state, in order to receive compensation. 14
C. Contracts
In the area of contract law, the cases before the court in 1988
predominantly addressed collateral issues, such as settlement and rem-
edies, rather than substantive issues relating to the nature and enforce-
ment of claims.
The most common way to dispose of a claim other than by judi-
cial proceeding is through an out-of-court settlement between the par-
ties. While a mutually satisfactory settlement must generally be
reduced to writing to be considered valid and enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, 141 the parties are estopped from subsequently deny-
ing such settlement if "the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits... the making of an agreement." 142 In Pavek v. Curran, 143 the
court enfored a previously agreed upon settlement despite one party's
refusal to execute it, holding that a client will be bound by his attor-
ney's statement that he has agreed to settle provided the client is pres-
ent at the settlement hearing and fails to object to the terms of the
agreement. 1 4
Another means of non-judicial settlement of a claim is by accord
and satisfaction. When a party negotiates a check which states that
acceptance of the check constitutes full payment, he implicitly agrees
to accord and satisfaction and relinquishes the right to sue for further
amounts. 145 In Danac, Inc. v. Gudenau & Co., 146 the court ruled that
in such a situation, the creditor has the option to destroy the check
and sue for all amounts which it believes it is owed or to negotiate the
instrument and consider the dispute settled.147 Therefore, an election
to negotiate the check would constitute acceptance of the check for the
full value of the obligation.
The court discussed the equitable remedy of restitution in Ben
Lomond, Inc. v. Allen. 148 Restitution is typically granted to a party
defaulting on a contract to the extent that the benefit retained by the
non-breaching party exceeds the damages incurred by that party as a
140. Fehir, 755 P.2d at 1109-1110; ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.301(a)(2) (1986).
141. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (1983).
142. Id. § 09.25.020(4).
143. 754 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1988).
144. Id. at 1127.
145. Danac, Inc. v. Gudenau & Co., 751 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1988) (finding
attempt to reserve rights through a letter ineffective).
146. 751 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1988).
147. Id. at 950 (citing Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska
(1983)).
148. 758 P.2d 92 (Alaska 1988).
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consequence of the breach. 149 The burden of proof is on the defaulting
party to prove the amount by which the benefits exceed the
damages. 150
The court also decided an issue concerning the standing of a con-
tractor to assert a claim for breach of contract. The applicable statute
requires a contractor to be registered in order to be able to bring such
a claim.1 51 In Hale v. Vitale, 15 2 the court ruled that, so long as a
contractor is registered at the time of entering into the contract and
the registration is valid, the suit may not be dismissed for his failure to
be bonded.15 3
D. General Business
The court decided six cases which fall into the area of general
business, two of which relate to the form of incorporation of an enter-
prise and are fairly fact specific. An additional three decisions address
routine problems occurring in business relationships, while the re-
maining, and perhaps most important, case incorporates into Alaska
law a federal exception to the doctrine of finality of judgments.
In Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 15 4 the court narrowly
applied the "common accident" exception to the doctrine of finality of
judgments. This case concerned a shareholder's motion for relief from
a judgment dismissing an action for loss in value arising from breach
of a shareholders' agreement. The plaintiff initially brought his claim
in 1982 and was denied recovery.1 55 Because the court subsequently
awarded relief to a second party who suffered the identical harm from
the defendant in the same transaction, the court ruled that the original
plaintiff was entitled to an exception under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) which
would permit the claim to be relitigated.15 6 In balancing the interest
in the finality of judgments against the interest in maintaining public
confidence in the judicial system, the court held that "when two liti-
gants are injured in the same 'accident' and only one recovers" due to
149. Id. at 94-95.
150. Id. at 95.
151. ALASKA STAT. § 08.18.151 (1987).
152. 751 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
153. Id. at 489. Hale had been bonded, but his bond was cancelled six months
before entering into the contract. Id. at 488.
154. 761 P.2d 713 (Alaska 1988).
155. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982), over-
ruled on other grounds by Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197
(Alaska 1986).
156. Norman, 761 P.2d at 717. Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure rule 60(b)(6) pro-
vides, "the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment... [if] (6) any other
reason justiffies] relief from the operation of the judgment." ALASKA R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6).
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a faulty application of law, "a compelling case is presented for diver-
gence from strict application of the finality of judgment doctrine." 15 7
In a significant decision involving partnership law, Parker v.
Northern Mixing Co.,1 58 the court held that an agreement to share
profits does not in and of itself conclusively prove the existence of a
partnership, 59 stating that an individual who advances money to a
partnership does not by law become a partner merely because he is
entitled to a share in the profits.16° Rather, the fact that he expects
repayment of the obligation, coupled with the fact that he has no ex-
pectation of management or control of the business, tends to prove
that he is merely a creditor of the partnership and not a general
partner. 161
Parker involved an action for accounting in a dissolution of the
partnership. The court ruled that, with respect to the parties who
were partners, personal services rendered may qualify as a non-cash
capital contribution to a partnership, but only if an express or implied
agreement edsts to that effect.162 Finally, the court addressed the ex-
tent of each partner's liability for losses of the partnership. In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, each partner shares in losses
according to his predetermined share in the profits and not pro rata
according to his capital contribution.1 63
The rules governing close corporations are more akin to partner-
ship law than to traditional corporate doctrines. In Stevens ex rel. Park
View Corp. v. Richardson, 164 the court adopted the common law rule
that directors of a close corporation may not vote to compensate
themselves for past services in the absence of an express or implied
agreement.165 However, ratification by a disinterested majority of
shareholders will approve such action even in the absence of any
agreement.1 66 The court upheld the compensation awarded in Stevens
despite the inclusion of interested shareholder votes in the majority,
ruling that the directors' action is presumptively valid unless the dis-
senting shareholder proves that the transaction was substantively
unfair.1 67
157. Norman, 761 P.2d at 717.
158. 756 P.2d 881 (Alaska 1988).
159. Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, 887 (Alaska 1988); see also
ALAsKA STAT. § 32.05.020(3) (1986).
160. Id. at 887.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 888. The court remanded this issue to the trial court for a determina-
tion of whether such an agreement existed.
163. Id. at 890; ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.130(1) (1986).
164. 755 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1988).
165. Id. at 392.
166. Id. at 395.
167. Id. The dissenting shareholder failed to meet this burden in Stevens.
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The court discussed the rights of former employees in Data Man-
agement, Inc. v. Greene, 168 where it addressed the validity of over-
broad covenants not to compete. Rejecting such covenants as
unconscionable per se, the court adopted the position that "if an over-
broad covenant not to compete can be reasonably altered to render it
enforceable, then [a] court shall do so unless it determines the cove-
nant was not drafted in good faith."' 169
In Foltz-Nelson Architects v. Kobylk 170 the court determined the
proper method of computing the time in which an action may be com-
menced to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The court held that the six-
month statutory period begins to run the day after an extension of the
lien has been filed and terminates six months from the date of filing. 171
Finally, the court took a strong position against anti-competitive
practices in government procurement in McBirney & Associates v.
State. 172 Acknowledging the need for "as much fairness, certainty,
publicity, and absolute impartiality"'173 as is possible in competitive
bidding, the court ruled that preferential dealings in pre-solicitation
negotiations and the availability of inside information constitute
"demonstrated impropriety" that is wholly unacceptable in govern-
ment procurement. 174 Therefore, in this case the court denied the
award of a public contract to a bidder who had access to inside infor-
mation that conferred upon him an unfair advantage against compet-
ing bidders. 175
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1988, the supreme court was faced with only three cases that
were dominated by questions of law under the federal and Alaska con-
stitutions. The first of these, a case interpreting the federal Constitu-
tion, is Vest v. Schafer. 176 Vest, originally a constitutional challenge to
168. 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988).
169. Id. at 64. This rule represents an adoption of Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, section 184(2), and is consistent with Alaska Statutes section 45.02.302, which
provides an option to modify an unconscionable clause in a contract rather than inval-
idate the contract in its entirety. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op CoNTRACTS § 184(2)
(1981); ALAsKA STAT. § 45.02.302 (1986). The burden of proving good faith is
shifted to the employer in this situation. Greene, 757 P.2d at 64.
170. 749 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1988).
171. Id. at 1348. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 01.10.080 (1982), 34.35.080(a)(2) (1985 &
Supp. 1988).
172. 753 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1988).
173. Id. at 1136 (citing Pratt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 16 Wash. App.
265, 271, 555 P.2d 421, 421, 427 (1976) (citations omitted)).
174. Id. at 1137.
175. Id. at 1138.
176. 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska), petition for cert filed, No. 88-447 (1988).
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an Alaska statute177 which was later found to violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, involved on second appeal a
suit for damages for benefits that were lost as a result of the operation
of the statute. The court affirmed the superior court's grant of sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiffs for several reasons.
First, the court, upholding its decision in State v. Green, 178 held
that not only is the state protected from section 1983 claims by its
eleventh amendment immunity, but also states are not "persons" for
the purposes of section 1983.179 The consequence of this holding is to
immunize states from such suits in both state and federal courts.
Second, the court refused to permit a judicially created damages
remedy (Bivens-type remedies)180 in this case because the United
States Supreme Court has not recognized such remedies in either
(1) actions against states, or (2) actions under the fourteenth
amendment. 181
Finally, the court decided that claims against the administrator of
the longevity bonus program are barred because, when the administra-
tor is sued in her official capacity, she is immune. 182 Also, because
such claims are actually directed against the state, the administrator is
not a proper party defendant at all if sued in her personal capacity.18 3
The court was required to interpret a provision of the Alaska
Constitution that prohibits political subdivisions of the state from con-
tracting debt184 in Village of Chefornak v. Hooper Bay Construction
Co. 185 In an action for breach of contract, Chefornak's attorney dis-
cussed a proposed settlement with city council members, many of
whom did not speak English.18 6 Leaving the meeting with the belief
that settlement was authorized, the attorney signed a stipulation for
entry of judgment against the city.187 The city subsequently moved to
have the judgment set aside, arguing primarily that it violated the
177. The statute in question was the state's Longevity Bonus Program, which paid
monthly benefits to "twenty-five year Alaska residents, age 65 or over, who had been
domiciled in Alaska before statehood." ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.45.010-47.45.170 (1984
& Supp. 1988).
178. 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981).
179. Vest, 757 P.2d at 591; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
180. Id. at 594. Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (holding that a violation of the fourth amendment by a federal agent acting
under color of his authority gave rise to a cause of action for damages directly under
the Constitution, even though no such action had been provided for by statute).
181. Vest, 757 P.2d at 596.
182. Id. at 599.
183. Id. at 599-600.
184. ALASKA CONST. art IX, § 9.
185. 758 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1988).
186. Id. at 1268.
187. Id.
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Alaska Constitution's municipal debt restrictions. 8 The court re-
jected the village's argument and held that the contract was enforcea-
ble. The court reasoned that the provision was intended only "to
restrict a municipality's ability to voluntarily borrow funds or issue
bonds," 189 and not "to insulate cities from valid judgments."1 90
A final dispute arising under the Alaska Constitution took place
in Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc. 191 In Patrick the plaintiff chal-
lenged an Alaska statute requiring out-of-state plaintiffs to post secur-
ity bonds for "anticipated costs and attorneys' fees as a condition of
bringing suit in an Alaska Court."' 92 The court struck down the stat-
ute, holding that it violated the equal protection provision of the
Alaska Constitution in that it "unreasonably restricts nonresident ac-
cess to Alaska Courts."' 193 Specifically, the court felt that, although
access to the court system is not a fundamental right, it is a right im-
portant enough to demand close scrutiny of any statute abrogating
it. 194 Because the statute is both overinclusive (it imposes the require-
ment on all nonresident plaintiffs regardless of their ability or willing-
ness to pay judgments) and underinclusive (it does not impose such
requirements on resident plaintiffs who may be difficult debtors), the
court found the statute unconstitutional. 195
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
The criminal cases decided by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1988
were concerned less with the substantive offenses charged than with
the procedural problems accompanying the arrests and trials, despite a
diverse sampling of underlying offenses, which ranged from sexual as-
sault on a minor to murder to driving while intoxicated. The court
188. Id.; ALASKA CONsT. art. IX, § 9.
189. Village of Chefornak, 758 P.2d at 1269.
190. Id.
191. 765 P.2d 1375 (Alaska 1988).
192. Section 09.60.060 of the Alaska Statutes provides:
Security for costs where plaintiff a nonresident or foreign corporation. When
the plaintiff in an action resides out of the state or is a foreign corporation,
security for the costs and attorney fees, which may be awarded against the
plaintiff, may be required by the defendant, if timely demand is made within
30 days after the defendant discovers that the plaintiff is a nonresident.
When required, all proceedings in the action shall be stayed until an under-
taking executed by one or more sufficient sureties is fied with the court to
the effect that they will pay the costs and attorney fees which are awarded
against the plaintiff, for not less than $200. A new or an additional under-
taking may be ordered by the court upon proof that the original undertaking
is insufficient in amount or security.
Id. at 1376 n.2 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.060 (1983)).
193. Id. at 1376.
194. Id. at 1379.
195. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.060 (1983).
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generally adopted a conservative stance, tightening the grasp of the
law on offenders, except for the cases in which the defendant's consti-
tutional rights were at issue, where the court tended to be more pro-
tective of the defendant.
This juxtaposition is best demonstrated in the cases relating to
evidentiary issues. For example, in Clifton v. State,196 the court re-
versed and remanded a first degree murder conviction, holding that
the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach the de-
fense witness with prior convictions that were more than five years old
because they were not necessary for a fair determination of the case. 197
The court established a two-step analysis to determine whether "stale"
convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes. First, a court
must "weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect."' 9 Second, it must determine whether "admission of the evi-
dence is necessary for a fair determination of the case." 199
In another case respecting admissibility of certain evidence, the
court moved to protect defendants from the use of illegally extracted
convictions. In Webb v. State,200 the arresting officers read the defend-
ant his Miranda2 1 rights but informed him that they would not return
his driver's license unless he followed them to police headquarters and
gave a statement. The court found that the statement was involuntary
due to the coercive nature of the troopers' actions and therefore was
inadmissible.202 In so holding, the court adopted a per se rule deeming
"involuntary a Miranda waiver obtained by conditioning the exercise
of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination against the
loss of another constitutionally protected interest. '20 3
In cases involving prisoners, the court further protected the con-
stitutional rights of defendants on evidentiary issues; however, it
otherwise ruled more strictly with respect to personal liberties. De-
partment of Corrections v. Kraus2°4 involved two prisoners, Kraus and
Winter, who had been sanctioned for violating prison rules and corre-
spondingly lost a portion of their accrued "good time. '205 The court
cited an earlier opinion, McGinnis v. Stevens, 206 in which it held that
196. 751 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1988).
197. Id. at 29.
198. Id.; ALASKA R. EVID. 609(c).
199. Clifton, 751 P.2d at 29; ALAsKA R. EVID. 609(b).
200. 756 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1988).
201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
202. Webb, 756 P.2d at 297.
203. Id. The court held that the retention of Webb's driver's license constituted a
denial of his property without due process of law.
204. 759 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1988).
205. Id. at 539.
206. 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975).
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while inmates do not have an automatic right of appeal, they are enti-
tled to judicial review only when "fundamental constitutional rights
are alleged to be abridged in disciplinary proceedings. 20 7 The court
found that Winter's claim that the disciplinary committee had relied
on evidence not offered in the proceeding constituted a defect amount-
ing to a failure of due process. 20 8 However, with respect to Kraus'
claim that the punishment was excessive, the court held that excessive
sanctions do not constitute an abridgement of constitutional rights.209
In another case concerning prisoners and good time, the court
answered the narrow question of "whether a person imprisoned for
refusal to pay a fine is entitled to 'good time' reductions to his sen-
tence." 210 In Murphy v. City of Wrangell,211 the court interpreted the
relevant statute,2 12 which guarantees such reductions only to prisoners
"convicted of an offense against the state and sentenced to imprison-
ment, '2 13 as excluding from the definition of "offense" the refusal to
pay a fine.2 14 The court limited the statute's application to situations
involving a breach of the criminal law, misdemeanor, or felony,
thereby holding that Murphy was not entitled to a "good time"
reduction. 215
In keeping with its propensity to protect individuals' due process
rights, the court, in Matter of Elder, 2 16 addressed the rights of an indi-
vidual who had been held in contempt and imprisoned for failing to
return money he had unlawfully appropriated from an insurance set-
tlement awarded to his comatose brother.217 The court found that
such incarceration takes on a punitive character and is improper if the
individual is unable to comply with the court's order (to return the
misappropriated funds.)218 The court held that when the funds or
property ordered to be produced are held by third parties or have been
converted to illiquid form and the contemnor has no control, he may
not be imprisoned without first being granted the due process protec-
tion generally accorded criminal defendants.219
207. Kraus, 759 P.2d at 540 (citing McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1236 n.45
(Alaska 1975)).
208. Id. at 529.
209. Id. at 540-41.
210. Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 230 (Alaska 1988).
211. 763 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1988).
212. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010 (1986).
213. Id.
214. Murphy, 763 P.2d at 231.
215. Id. at 232.
216. 763 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1988).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 222-23.
219. Id. at 223.
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The court was extremely conservative in considering statute of
limitations issues, which bore harsh consequences for criminal defend-
ants. In State v. Creekpaum, 220 the court found that it is constitution-
ally permissible to extend the statute of limitations for the crime of
sexual assault on a minor, provided the statutory amendment creating
the extension was enacted before the original statute had run in a par-
ticular case.221 At the time of the alleged offense in Creekpaum, the
applicable statute of limitations was five years.2 22 While the statutory
period was running, the legislature enlarged the period for bringing
charges to five years plus the earlier of (1) one year after the crime has
been reported, or (2) the time the victim reaches the age of sixteen. 223
Relying primarily on Weaver v. Graham2 24 and Clements v.
United States,225 the court found that the extension of a statute of limi-
tations was merely a procedural change that did not affect the substan-
tive rights of the defendant.2 26  The extension was not an
unconstitutional ex post facto law because it did not render a previ-
ously innocent act criminal, aggravate or increase the punishment for
the crime charged, alter the rules of evidence, or penalize the defend-
ant for an otherwise innocent act.227
With respect to criminal suspects as plaintiffs, the court was more
lenient, extending an individual's ability to bring suit against the police
and vindicate his personal rights. In Jenkins v. Daniels,228 the court
determined the appropriate statute of limitations on claims for false
arrest and imprisonment. Finding that such claims are brought
against police officers acting in their official capacity, the court held
that they are subject to the three-year statute of limitations governing
claims against "peace officers."'2 29 In the same case, however, the
court held that a civil rights claim for arrest without probable cause 230
resulting from the same incident was a personal injury claim and not a
claim against a peace officer. Therefore, such a claim is subject to the
two-year tort limitation period.231
220. 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988).
221. Id. at 1140.
222. ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.010 (1984).
223. Id. § 12.10.020(c) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
224. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
225. 266 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959).
226. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d at 1144.
227. Id. at 1143 (citing Clements v. United States, 266 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959)).
228. 751 P.2d 19 (Alaska 1988).
229. Id. at 23; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.060(a) (1983).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Although the plaintiff did not proceed in the
supreme court under this statute, it is the applicable statute for a civil rights claim.
Jenkins, 751 P.2d at 23.
231. Jenkins, 751 P.2d at 24; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
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Pletnikoffv. Johnson,2 32 although a civil rape case, derives from a
criminal complaint. Pletnikoff had been convicted of rape in a crimi-
nal proceeding; the conviction was later overturned due to inadmissi-
ble evidence, and he subsequently pleaded nolo contendere.233
Reversing the superior court's decision, the court held that the crimi-
nal conviction had no collateral estoppel effect on the issue of defend-
ant's liability in a civil proceeding. 234 In order to have a binding
collateral estoppel effect, "a judgment must be valid, final and on the
merits. '235 Reversal of the conviction by an appellate court prevented
it from satisfying the finality requirement.236
The final category of criminal cases addresses the offense of driv-
ing while intoxicated ("DWI"). 237 Again, the court adhered to its
general dichotomy of conservative resolution of substantive issues and
leniency with respect to the fundamental rights of criminal suspects.
In State, Department of Public Safety v. Conley,238 the court broadened
the definition of "driving" to require that the automobile be in the
defendant's physical control and that it be operable.2 39 With respect
to physical control, the court adopted the position that the car's en-
gine need not be running; rather, it is sufficient to show that "[a] per-
son be in the driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the steering wheel, in
possession of the ignition key, and in such condition that he is physi-
cally capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to
move.''24° Concerning the issue of operability, the court found that
the Department of Public Safety need show merely "that the car is
'reasonably capable of being rendered operable.' ",241
In Ward v. State,242 the court reversed a lower court DWI convic-
tion, holding, inter alia, that the failure by the arresting officer to allow
the suspect his statutory opportunity to obtain an independent
232. 765 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1988).
233. Id. at 974.
234. Id. at 976.
235. Id. (quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & B. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4432, at 298 (1981)).
236. Id. at 976. The court declined to express a view as to the res judicata effect of
Pletnikoff's nolo contendere plea because it had not been suficiently briefed by the
parties. Id. at 976 n.2. The dissent did not view this as a problem, however, expres-
sing the opinion that a conviction resulting from a nolo plea "may be used for any
purpose for which any conviction based on a plea of guilty might be used," including
collateral estoppel. Id. at 981 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
237. ALAsKA STAT. § 28.15.165 (1984).
238. 754 P.2d 232 (Alaska 1988).
239. Id. at 234-36.
240. Id. at 235 (quoting Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St. 2d 94, 97-98, 351 N.E.2d
85, 87-88 (1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977)).
241. Id. at 236 (quoting State v. Smelter, 36 Wash. App. 439, 444, 674 P.2d 690,
693 (1984)).
242. 758 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1988).
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breathalyzer test243 was a violation of his rights.2'4 Therefore, the sus-
pect was entitled to suppression of the results of the test administered
by the police in order to enable him to put forth a meaningful
defense.245
Finally, in Miller v. State, Department of Public Safety,246 the
court addressed the collateral estoppel effect of a prior criminal DWI
conviction on a subsequent administrative license revocation proceed-
ing. Because the defendant pled no contest to the DWI charges, the
police stop which resulted in his arrest was ruled presumptively
valid. 247 However, the court allowed him to challenge the stop's valid-
ity in the revocation hearing, stating that the prior criminal proceed-
ing had no res judicata effect on the issue of the stop's validity because
the defendant did not testify at the criminal hearing.24 8 The court nev-
ertheless affirmed the revocation of the license since it independently
found on the facts that the police officer had due cause for the stop.249
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
During 1988, the court decided numerous cases in the field of
employment law. Those cases have been separated into two major
subcategories, wrongful discharge and workers' compensation, as well
as an additional subcategory that includes the miscellaneous issues.
A. Wrongful Discharge
While many of the wrongful discharge cases in 1988 restated fun-
damental principles of employment law, such as requirements of "am-
ple notice and opportunity to be heard," 250 perhaps a more significant
development in the field of employment law involved the supreme
court's decision in ARGO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers,251 in which the court
capitalized on an opportunity to clarify the state of the law with re-
gard to terminability at will. In ARCO, the court held, inter alia,252
243. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.033(e) (1984).
244. Ward, 758 P.2d at 90-91.
245. Id. at 91.
246. 761 P.2d 117 (Alaska 1988).
247. Id. at 117.
248. Id. at 118.
249. Id. at 119.
250. Degnan v. Bering Strait School Dist., 753 P.2d 146, 149 (Alaska 1988).
251. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
252. The opinion also presents useful insights on both the amount of evidence nec-
essary to present a jury question on the issue of just cause and the proper jury instruc-
tions for a cause of action based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
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that punitive damages are not recoverable in a wrongful discharge ac-
tion for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.2 53 In doing so, the court brought Alaska law in line with
authority in other states similarly refusing to grant punitive damages
for such a breach.254 The court rationalized its decision by explaining
that the implied covenant is an obligation springing from the contract
itself. "Mere breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, however, does not constitute a tort. ' 25 5 As such, breach of an
implied covenant should be redressed only through traditional con-
tract remedies such as compensatory damages or, in extreme cases,
specific enforcement of the contract.
The court did suggest, however, that in instances where the
breach also constitutes an independent tort, punitive damages may be
proper.256 One example of such an independent tort is the violation of
the public policy exception; however, the ARCO court expressly re-
fused to state whether this exception, well known in other jurisdic-
tions, would be valid under Alaska law.257
The court also refused to recognize the public policy exception25 s
in Walt v. State,259 a case involving a wrongful discharge action which
raised questions about (1) the qualified immunity of public officials,
and (2) the preclusive effect of a collective bargaining agreement on
statutory and common law tort claims.
With regard to the first issue, the court held that the official who
discharged Walt should be granted immunity from suit under section
1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, since his actions did not
violate constitutional rights of the employee in existence at the time
the official's decision was made.2 6c Specifically, Walt's constitutional
253. ARCO, P.2d at 1154.
254. For examples of such decisions in other states, see Martin v. Federal Life Ins.
Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 607, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (1982) (refusing to recognize a
tort remedy based on an employer's "bad faith" breach of an implied covenant of fair
dealing); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974)
(plaintiff cannot recover damages for mental suffering in an action for breach of an
employment contract). But see Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil, 36 Cal.
3d 752, 780, 686 P.2d 1158, 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 370 (1984) ("A breach of con-
tract may also constitute a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing... "); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) (a
breach of duty to deal fairly and in good faith by an employer is a tort).
255. ARCO, 753 P.2d at 1154.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1153. See, eg., Glenn v. Clearman's Gold Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
258. Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1353 n.16 (Alaska 1988).
259. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
260. Id. at 1349; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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right to a pretermination hearing261 did not become clear until the
United States Supreme Court decided Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill,262 months after the decision to terminate was made. 263
Therefore, reliance on pre-Loudermill standards for pretermination
hearings and determination of the immunity question was justified.
In determining that Walt's tort claims should be barred by the
collective bargaining agreement, the court relied not only on the ex-
press language of the agreement but also on existing caselaw from
Alaska and other states that suggests that disputes arising out of such
agreements ought to be decided on contractual grounds according to
established grievance procedures set forth in the agreement, and not
on tort theory.2 "
261. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
262. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
263. Walt, 751 P.2d at 1349.
264. Id. at 1351. In the opinion at pages 1350-1353, the court discusses cases sup-
porting this position, including Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that,
because the claims arose out of an employment relationship governed by administra-
tive procedures and remedies, it would be inappropriate for the court to imply a cause
of action and grant a non-statutory damages remedy); Stevens v. State, 746 P.2d 908
(Alaska 1987) (in general, the state does not owe a duty of care to its citizens when it
brings a cause of action against them); Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658
P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983) (analyzing whether arbitration was to be the exclusive remedy
for the claim); Cox v. United Technologies, Essex Group, Inc., 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d
456 (1986) (refusing to recognize a cause of action in tort arising from an employer-
employee dispute, where the employee is adequately protected from discharge by the
contract/collective bargaining agreement); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App.
511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985), aff'd, 397 Mass. 1004, 491 N.E.2d 252 (1986) (holding
that where there is a comprehensive remedial statute, creation of a new cause of action
based on public policy would interfere with that remedial scheme and frustrate legisla-
tive preference for administrative solutions to disputes between employers and em-
ployees); Phillips v. Babcock v. Wilcox, 349 Pa. Super. 351, 503 A.2d 36 (1986)
(refusing to recognize an action for tort of wrongful discharge when terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement provided protection against suspension or discharge
without proper cause). But see Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473
N.E.2d 1280 (1984) (recognizing an action in tort for wrongful discharge, independent
of any contract remedy available to employee through the collective bargaining agree-
ment based on a public policy rationale of protecting the employee from unscrupulous
employers), cert. denied, Prestress Eng'g Corp. v. Gonzalez, 472 U.S. 1032, and cert.
denied, Sackett-Chicago, Inc. v. Midgett, 474 U.S. 909 (1985), appeal after remand on
other grounds sub nom. Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d
308 (1986) (holding that a tort claim for wrongful discharge is clearly mandated by
public policy), petition for cert. filed, (Mar. 14, 1987); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.
Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (holding
that an employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge or discrimination
and that such an action is not preempted by contractual remedies or other statutory
provisions).
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Soon thereafter, the court decided a wrongful discharge suit chal-
lenging the validity of Alaska Statutes section 14.14.140(a), which pro-
vides in part as follows: "Members of the immediate family of a
school board member may not be employed by the school board ex-
cept upon written approval of the commissioner [of education]." 265
In Degnan v. Bering Strait School District,266 Charles Degnan's
employment contract was voided because his sister was an employee of
the school board. In disputing his termination, Degnan argued, inter
alia, that an Alaska Administrative Code provision defining "immedi-
ate family" as including "brother and sister"267 is invalid because it
conflicts with the "plain wording of [Alaska Statutes section]
14.14.140(a)." 268 The court, citing several cases involving both statu-
tory and contractual construction, held that "immediate family" as
used in the Alaska statute in question is "broad enough to include
siblings, '269 particularly in light of the statute's apparent purpose of
"preventing nepotism or the appearance of nepotism in local school
board hirings." 270 However, in a footnote, the court appears to back
away from a rigid interpretation of "immediate family" by stating that
in certain contexts "immediate family" may carry a more narrow
meaning.271
Morkunas v. Anchorage Telephone Utility27 2 involved another
wrongful discharge suit against a public employer. The central issue
before the supreme court was whether notice to the employee of the
imposition of a probationary period was required by law.273
Morkunas argued that he was entitled to notice pursuant to the rule
pertaining to probationary periods. 274 Anchorage Telephone Utility
argued that Morkunas was an executive employee whose employment
was governed exclusively by a rule that allows the mayor or a designee
265. ALASKA STAT. § 14.14.140(a) (1987).
266. 753 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1988).
267. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 18.900 (May 1971).
268. Degnan, 753 P.2d at 148.
269. Id. at 149 (citing Fisher v. Hodge, 162 Conn. 363, 294 A.2d 577 (1972); Gol-
ston v. Lincoln Cemetery, 573 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. App. 1978); Avrum Realty v. Talton,
120 Misc. 2d 534, 467 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. App. Term. 1983)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 149 n.5. The court did not elaborate on what these "contexts" might be
other than citing Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, 41 N.J. 521, 527-28, 197 A.2d 673,
676 (1964) (holding that property holdings of a brother not living in same household
as stockholder are not considered holdings of the "immediate family" member for
purposes of corporation franchise tax statute).
272. 754 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1988).
273. Id. at 1118-19.
274. Id. at 1119. See infra note 276 with regard to the relevant rule.
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to dismiss or demote without notice.275 The majority ruled that, pur-
suant to the relevant Anchorage Municipal Code section,276 Morkunas
was entitled to notice of his pending probationary status. 277 Interpret-
ing the rule literally, the court found that such an interpretation "fur-
thers the statutory purpose of informing employees of their rights and
benefits. '' 273 Therefore, the case was remanded for further determina-
tion as to whether such notice had been actually received.279
However, Justice Moore and Chief Justice Matthews argued con-
vincingly in dissent that Anchorage Municipal Code section
3.30.073(D) should not apply to Morkunas, since he was an "execu-
tive" employee who served at the pleasure of the mayor.2 0 Therefore,
they believed that Morkunas is governed only by Personnel Rule
17,281 granting the mayor plenary authority to demote an employee
without right of grievance or appeal, 282 so long as the demotion had no
discriminatory purpose. No such purpose was alleged here.283
Finally, in Kollodge v. State,284 the court held that (1) a dis-
charged employee who appealed a fourth-step grievance hearing after
the union refused to take his grievance to arbitration was time-barred
because such a suit is subject to the 30-day statute of limitations con-
tained in Appellate Rule 602(a)(2),285 and (2) the employee's suit
against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation is with-
out merit since the union represented the employee in a professional
manner and based its decision not to arbitrate on the judgment that
there was little likelihood of success. 286 The court was deferential to
the union's broad discretion in determining which grievances to take
to arbitration. Specifically, the court expressed reluctance to intrude
275. Morkunas, 754 P.2d at 1119; ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE
§§ 3.30.171-3.30.177.
276. The code stated the following:
Demoted Employees. When an employee is demoted to a position in a class
where he previously held permanent status, no probationary period shall be
served, except in the case of demotion for disciplinary reasons. When an
employee is demoted to a position in which he did not hold permanent status,
the agency head shall decide whether a probationary period will be served,
subject to approval of the director. The employee concerned shall be notified
of the decision, in writing before the demotion.
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.30.073(D), repealed (emphasis added).
277. Morkunas, 754 P.2d at 1119.
278. Id. at 1120.
279. Id.
280. Id. (Moore, J., and Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
281. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 3.30.171-3.30.177.
282. Morkunas, 754 P.2d at 1120.
283. Id. at 1119 n.6.
284. 757 P.2d 1028 (Alaska 1988).
285. Id. at 1033.
286. Id. at 1036.
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upon this discretion, absent evidence of arbitrariness, discrimination,
or bad faith.287
B. Workers' Compensation
The court also decided a host of cases in the workers' compensa-
tion area. The tendency of the court in these cases has been to force
employers to comply with statutory requirements by strictly enforcing
legislative intent.
In Wade Oifield Service Co. v. Providence Washington Insurance
Co., 28 8 the court affirmed superior court rulings that (1) for purposes
of determining workers' compensation insurance premiums under the
payroll limitation rule, employees who work regular, seven-day,
twelve-hour shifts, one week on/one week off, shall be deemed to have
been employed under a single, year-long employment contract rather
than twenty-six separate one-week contracts; 289 and (2) it was reason-
able to charge employer premiums for coverage of oil platform em-
ployees under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act290 since, at the time, the settled law appeared to make such work-
ers subject to the Act.291 The court adopted this position despite the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Herb's Welding, Ina v.
Gray,292 a case which was decided after the superior court ruled in
Wade Oilfield.293
The court established a new standard for calculating benefits in
certain instances of permanent disability in Peck v. Alaska Aeronauti-
cal, Inc.294 Acknowledging that the Workers' Compensation Board
and the lower court calculated disability benefits which appear on
their face to comply with the statute,295 the court nevertheless held
that such a result is grossly unfair and would tend to negate the under-
lying legislative intent of such statutes which attempt to award "in-
jured employees an amount reasonably representing their future
earning capacity. ' 296 Specifically, the statute would seem to require
287. Id. at 1034 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
288. 759 P.2d 1302 (Alaska 1988).
289. Id. at 1306.
290. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
291. Wade Oijfield, 759 P.2d at 1307.
292. 470 U.S. 414 (1985). The Wade Oilfield court characterized the Herb's Weld-
ing decision as holding "that a welder who performed exclusively welding functions
on a fixed offshore oil platform was not engaged in 'maritime employment' and thus
did not qualify for benefits under the [Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act]." Wade Oilfield, 759 P.2d at 1306.
293. Wade Oilfeld, 759 P.2d at 1306.
294. 756 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1988).
295. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.175(b), 23.30.220(3) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
296. Peck, 756 P.2d at 288.
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that benefits be calculated based on the rate of pay at the time of Mr.
Peck's initial injury (1964) rather than the rate in effect at the time he
became permanently disabled (1982).297 The court refused to allow
such a result and remanded for recalculation of benefits, consistent
with the newly announced standard.298
In Alaska International Constructors v. Kinter,299 the court ad-
dressed the standard for determining whether a claimant was perma-
nently disabled so as to merit compensation. Defining "permanent" to
mean "lasting the rest of claimant's life, ' ' 3°° sufficient evidence existed
to show that Mr. Kinter (a welder) was permanently disabled, for pur-
poses of the relevant statute,30 1 even though experts offered "some
cautious comments that Kinter might someday be able to work in a
non-demanding job. ' 30 2 The court further held that a claimant "need
not establish that there is no chance of him ever doing anything
again. ' 303 Consequently, the potential future ability to perform "odd
jobs" or "sedentary work" does not preclude a claimant from "perma-
nent total disability classification. ''304
Alaska International Constructors v. State30 5 involved the inter-
pretation of the Alaska Second Injury Fund statute.30 6 The purpose of
the statute is to remove disincentives to hiring physically impaired
workers by reimbursing employers for compensation payments neces-
sitated, at least in part, by the preexisting injury. 30 7 In order to obtain
reimbursement, the employer must prove through written records that
it knew of the injury prior to hiring the employee. 30 8 The court held
297. Id. at 287-88.
298. Id.
299. 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988).
300. Id. at 1105.
301. Section 23.30.180 of the Alaska Statutes, as applicable at the time of Mr. Kin-
ter's injury, provided:
In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent 66 2/3 percent of the
injured employee's average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee dur-
ing the continuance of total disability. Loss of both hands, or both arms, or
both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two of them, in the absence of
conclusive proof to the contrary, constitutes permanent total disability. In
all other cases permanent total disability is determined in accordance with
the facts.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.180 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
302. Kinter, 755 P.2d at 1105.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 755 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1988).
306. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (1984).
307. Alaska International, 755 P.2d at 1092.
308. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205(c) (1984).
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that an employer may not satisfy the knowledge requirement by pro-
viding written records kept by the union.309 For purposes of the stat-
ute, these records must be in the employer's possession.310 The court
specifically rejected the argument that the union's knowledge should
be imputed to the employer since the union acts as the employer's
agent in hiring.311 Specifically, the court noted that a union is the
agent of its employee/members and not the employer, 312 and if the
definition of "employer" were extended to include unions, certain em-
ployers could unjustifiably benefit from the fund, thereby circum-
venting legislative intent.313
Accurate testimony regarding a plaintiff's physical condition is
critical to a fair determination of disability in a workers compensation
claim. In Grainger v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, 14 the
court remanded a workers' compensation case to the superior court
for further determination of the facts because the doctor who ex-
amined the claimant appeared, upon testifying, to be unfamiliar with
the case.315 Citing its decisions in Wade v. Anchorage School Dis-
trict3 1 6 and Fox v. Alascom, Inc.,317 the court ruled that when the evi-
dence is insufficient for a proper resolution of the issues, the proper
response is to remand the case for further determination.
318
In Cuffe v. Sanders Construction Co.,319 the court was faced with
a question involving the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act,320 which makes the statutory remedy
the exclusive remedy available to employees injured on the job. The
remedy negates all other liability of the employer or co-employees.
3 21
In Cuffie, the defendant attempted to defend a suit for tortious negli-
gence by claiming co-employee status.322 However, the plaintiff intro-
duced evidence suggesting that the defendant was not a co-employee
309. Alaska International, 755 P.2d at 1093.
310. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (1984).
311. Alaska International, 755 P.2d at 1093.
312. Id. (quoting 51 CJ.S. Labor Relations § 43 (1967)).
313. Id.
314. 751 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1988).
315. Id. at 1355-56 n.1.
316. 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987) (holding that Worker's Compensation Board
could not rely on evidence that claimant did not experience unusual stress not exper-
ienced by other employees in similar position).
317. 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986) (holding that a mentally disabled employee's be-
lief that her disability resulted from job-related stress was not dispositive on that issue,
rejecting all objective threshold tests for mental stress claims).
318. Grainger, 751 P.2d at 1355.
319. 748 P.2d 328 (Alaska 1988).
320. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1984).
321. Cuffe, 748 P.2d at 329.
322. The defendant, president of a general contracting firm, was operating a fork-
lift which caused injury to the claimant.
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and was therefore not immune from suit.323 The plaintiff named the
defendant's company, the general contractor, as an additional party
defendant.3 24 The company pleaded as a defense the fact that the
claimant had failed to introduce evidence that the general contractor
"retained control" over the claimant's company, an independent con-
tractor.3 25 I.e court held that (1) when conflicting inferences may be
drawn from evidence of co-employee status, a jury question is
presented and a directed verdict is improper;3 26 and (2) "when a gen-
eral contractor's employee injures a subcontractor's employee by his
own affirmative act of negligence, the general contractor remains liable
without regard to the extent of his control over the subcontractor's
work" because of standard principles of respondeat superior.327
While employers' liability for injury or death of their employees is
usually limited by workers' compensation statutes such as those dis-
cussed above,328 plaintiffs often seek other remedies under the com-
mon law. One example of the types of issues that arise in this context
is Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp.329 In Croxton, the court found
an exception to the general rule of non-assignability of personal injury
claims. In the limited context where an employer or his insurer has
been assigned a cause of action by operation of a workers' compensa-
tion statute,330 the employer (or insurer) may validly reassign the ac-
tion to the employee's estate without violating public policy. 331 The
court was willing to allow such an exception because none of the pol-
icy reasons supporting the general rule of non-assignability, such as
unscrupulous trafficking in choses of action or champertous beha-
viour, are present, and the reassignment represents merely the restora-
tion of the real parties in interest.332
323. Cuffe, 748 P.2d at 329.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 331.
326. Id
327. Id at 332.
328. See supra notes 319-27 and accompanying text.
329. 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988).
330. Section 23.30.015(c) of the Alaska Statutes provides that an employer who
has paid money into the state's Second Injury Fund as part of a compensation scheme
for an employee who has died without any dependents will be assigned the rights of
the deceased to pursue any actions against third persons. Further, if the employer's
insurer has paid the compensation, such rights will be assigned to the insurer.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(c) (1984).
331. Croxton, 758 P.2d at 99.
332. Id.
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C. Miscellaneous
The court decided a variety of additional employment law cases
which address diverse substantive areas such as employment con-
tracts, arbitration, overtime pay, and unions. In Municipality of
Anchorage v. Higgins,333 the court was faced with a breach of contract
case involving an employee's allegedly wrongful reclassification. In
Higgins, the employer sought to dismiss the claim because the em-
ployee failed to exhaust his internal administrative remedies. 334 The
superior court denied the motion, basing its decision on the employee's
claim of futility.335 The futility argument arose because the adminis-
trative remedies involved appeals to individuals who had played in-
strumental roles in Higgins' reclassification. 336 However, because the
grievance procedure also allowed for arbitration,337 the supreme court
reversed the superior court's decision, holding that where impartial
arbitration is available, the futility defense normally will not excuse an
employee from the requirement of exhausting his or her administrative
remedies. 338 The court placed upon the employee the burden of prov-
ing that "a resort to arbitration.., would so certainly result in an
adverse decision as to render the remedy 'futile.' -339 The court then
remanded the case for further determination of Higgins' claim that the
municipality should be equitably estopped from asserting exhaustion
of remedies as a defense.34°
Alaska Public Employees Association v. City of Fairbanks341
presented the supreme court with the narrow question of whether the
compulsory binding arbitration provision of the Public Employment
Relations Act342 gave arbitration rights to all employees in the mixed
bargaining unit. 343 The supreme court affirmed the ruling below that
arbitration rights extend only to those employees who have been pro-
hibited from striking by other provisions of the Act.344 The court read
333. 754 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1988).
334. Id. at 746.
335. Id. at 747.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 747-48.
339. Id. at 748.
340. Id.
341. 753 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1988).
342. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b) (1984).
343. The bargaining unit in question included different classifications of employees,
some of whom were empowered to strike and some of whom were prohibited from
striking. Id. § 23.40.200(b), (c), (d).
344. Alaska Public Employees Ass'n, 753 P.2d at 727.
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the arbitration provision of the statute literally as applying to only
those employees empowered to strike.345
The court addressed the method of computing routine pay in
Janes v. Otis Engineering Corp. 346 Specifically, the court remanded for
a proper construction of the overtime pay regulation's definition of
"regular rate of pay," as well as a determination of whether the em-
ployer's scheme violated a federal regulation (incorporated by refer-
ence into the state regulation)347 governing employees who are paid at
two or more different rates during the work week.348 The federal regu-
lation required overtime work to be compensated at one and one-half
times the regular rate.3 49 Therefore, the court's decision reflects its
concern over the method of computing the "regular rate" in dual rate
situations as it relates to compliance with the federal regulation by
Alaska employers.350
Local 959, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wells35 , in-
volved an action by a union member against his local for intentional
infliction of emotional distress caused by the local's threats against the
member's life. Counsel for the local argued unsuccessfully that the
state law tort action was preempted by federal labor law statutes. 35 2
The supreme court held, inter alia, that (1) claims for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress are "so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that Congress would not have intended to invalidate the
state sanction, ' 353 (2) in claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, threats to one's life are outrageous conduct per se,354 and (3)
as a matter of law, emotional distress is a reasonably foreseeable result
of a threat against someone's life.355
In a decision largely limited to its facts, the court confronted an-
other employment contract issue in Parliment v. Yukon Flats School
345. Id. at 728. This literal interpretation results in denying arbitration to all em-
ployees but those classified as (a)(1) employees in section 23.40.200(a)(1) of the Alaska
Statutes. Those employees include police, fire, jail, and hospital personnel. ALASKA
STAT. § 23.40.200(a)(1) (1984).
346. 757 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1988).
347. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 15.100(b) (1985).
348. Janes, 757 P.2d at 55-56.
349. 29 C.F.R. § 778.107 (1988).
350. Janes, 757 P.2d at 55.
351. 749 P.2d 349 (Alaska.1988).
352. Id. at 356-57.
353. Id. at 355. The court adopts the United States Supreme Court's position in
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25, 430
U.S. 290 (1977), and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
354. Wells, 749 P.2d at 358.
355. Id.
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District.356 Parliment involved a school teacher's suit for breach of an
employment contract, as well as a suit in quantum meruit concerning
an agreement to haul water. The superior court granted partial relief
on both claims. The supreme court reversed, holding that (1) the em-
ployment contract never came into existence because the teacher failed
to meet one of the four conditions precedent to the contract, 357 and (2)
the quantum meruit theory failed because the defendant was not un-
justly enriched in that it had paid fair consideration for the water haul-
ing services by supplying electricity to the school which employed
plaintiff.358
Yukon's refusal to hire Parliment was based upon his non-fulfill-
ment of the fourth criterion, that Parliment be a Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA") employee at the time of transfer, because Parliment's
non-retention by the BIA became effective June 6, 1983 (prior to the
transfer).359 Parliment argued that since his case was later reopened
to correct a "procedural error in the non-retention process" 360 and
since the effective date of his termination was consequently changed to
February 23, 1984 (after the transfer), he was technically employed by
the BIA at the time of the transfer. Parliment argued, therefore, that
he had fulfilled all conditions precedent.361 The court found this latter
approach unavailing. 362 Parliment based his argument on Aleutian
Region R.E.A.A. v. Wolansky,363 in which the Alaska Supreme Court
held "that a wrongfully terminated teacher who 'should have been re-
tained' when his school district was absorbed by another district was
entitled to be reinstated by the new district. . .. ,,364 The court easily
distinguished the present case primarily because Parliment's
nonrentention, unlike Wolansky's, was "ultimately upheld on the mer-
its;" therefore, he was not a teacher who "should have been
retained." 365
356. 760 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1988).
357. Id. at 517. When it became clear that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA")
school which employed Parliment was about to be transferred to the state school sys-
tem, Yukon Flats promised to retain Parliment if he fulfilled the following four
conditions:
(1) that the Parliments receive a favorable recommendation from the local
school board, (2) that there be a transfer of the BIA school to Yukon Flats,
(3) that there be vacancies at the time of the transfer, and (4) that the Parli-
ments be BIA employees when the transfer occurred.
Id. at 514-15.
358. Id. at 518.
359. Id. at 515.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 517.
362. Id.
363. 630 P.2d 529 (Alaska 1981).
364. Parliment, 750 P.2d at 517 (quoting Wolansky, 630 P.2d at 532).
365. Id.
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Finally, the court confronted a traditional labor law issue involv-
ing dual representation in City of Fairbanks v. State, Department of
Labor.366 In this case, the court summarily affirmed a lower court
ruling that upheld the state Labor Relations Agency's determination
that the same union could represent both supervisory and rank-and-
file personnel of the Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System.367 The
court agreed with the lower court's reasoning that the Agency's policy
is both reasonable and consistent with public employees' statutory
rights to choose their own bargaining representatives. 368
VIII. FAMILY LAW
The supreme court decided seventeen cases this past year which
addressed a variety of issues in five primary areas of family law: juris-
diction, property division, child support, attorneys' fees, and parental
rights.
A. Jurisdiction
The cases decided by the court address jurisdiction in both di-
vorce proceedings and custody disputes. The Alaska statutes do not
contain a minimum residency requirement for a spouse to institute a
divorce proceeding. 369 Perito v. Perito370 upheld the common law ju-
risdictional requirement that one of the parties be domiciled in Alaska,
defining "domicile" as "physical presence plus an intent to remain per-
manently, '-71 where "permanently" means "indefinitely. ' 372 Mrs.
Perito filed a divorce action one day after she moved to Alaska.373
The court held that her failure to satisfy the thirty-day statutory resi-
dency requirement 74 was of no consequence because the residency
statute was "intended to define 'residency' only as the term is used in
other statutes. ' 375
Jurisdiction over custodial issues is typically determined under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"). 376 The
UCCJA generally vests Alaska with jurisdiction if it is the home state
366. 763 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1988).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 977.
369. This requirement (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.140) was repealed by
the state legislature (Act, ch. 208, § 5, 1975 Alaska Sess. Laws) after it was held un-
constitutional by the court in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).
370. 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
371. Id. at 898.
372. Id. at 898-99.
373. Id. at 896.
374. ALAsiA STAT. § 01.10.055 (Supp. 1988).
375. Perito, 756 P.2d at 898.
376. ALASicA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-25.30.910 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
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of the child 377 but allows for circumstances which may necessitate re-
moval or dismissal, such as inconvenience of forum.378 To ensure that
such removal does not leave a party stranded without an available fo-
rum, the court held in Waller v. Richardson 379 that for a court prop-
erly to decline jurisdiction, it must (1) articulate its reasons for doing
so,380 and (2) designate a specific state that is willing and able to as-
sume jurisdiction.381
The court also held that it will decline to exercise jurisdiction in a
custody battle under the UCCJA when the parent has "wrongfully
taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehen-
sible conduct .... "382 A court should deny jurisdiction when the
litigant's conduct is "so objectionable that a court... cannot in good
conscience permit the party access to its jurisdiction. ' 383 In Stokes v.
Stokes, 384 the court applied this rule and declined jurisdiction with re-
spect to a custody claim, but it remanded on the issue of a divorce
claim because divorce jurisdiction is not dependent on the UCCJA.38 5
The UCCJA will govern jurisdiction in all custody issues except
when it expressly conflicts with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 ("PKPA") 386 governing interstate custody disputes. This
statute was enacted to provide a uniform federal standard in determin-
ing which state has jurisdiction to modify an existing custody order.387
In Murphy v. Woerner, a mother, along with her two children, moved
from Kansas to Alaska and later obtained a modification of the Kan-
sas custody decree limiting the father's visitation rights and imposing
upon him a child support obligation. 388 The court vacated the modifi-
cation order because the children still maintained sufficient contact
377. Id. §§ 25.30.020(a)(1), 25.30.900(5).
378. Id. § 25.30.060 (1983).
379. 757 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1988).
380. IaL at 1038.
381. Id. at 1039-40.
382. Stokes v. Stokes, 751 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Alaska 1988) (citing ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.30.070(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988)). This principle also applies to modification. See
Waller v. Richardson, 757 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Alaska 1988) (Alaska Statutes section
25.30.070(b), regarding modification, "applies only when an Alaska court is asked to
modify a foreign custody decree.")
383. Stokes, 751 P.2d at 1366 (citing UCCJA § 8 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A.
143 (master ed. 1979)). In Stokes, the mother dismissed a divorce action she had
instituted in Ohio which awarded temporary custody to the father. Id. at 1364. She
then took the child to Alaska and recommenced divorce proceedings as an Alaska
resident. Id. at 1365. The court denied jurisdiction due to the reprehensible nature of
her conduct. Id. at 1366.
384. 751 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1988).
385. Id. at 1366.
386. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1982).
387. Murphy v. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749, 750 (Alaska 1988).
388. Id. at 750.
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with Kansas such that Kansas retained modification jurisdiction.38 9
Under the PKPA, Alaska would have the power to modify the decree
only if it has jurisdiction and Kansas no longer has jurisdiction or
declines to exercise it.39o
B. Property Division
Generally, the court has advocated broad discretion at the trial
court level in formulating equitable property divisions in divorce pro-
ceedings. However, as evidenced in Hilliker v. Hilliker,391 it has taken
a somewhat more critical stand with respect to alimony awards.392
When the marital assets are sufficiently large such that a property
award may be fashioned to furnish adequate support, the court will
decline to award alimony on the grounds that it is unjust and
unnecessar.
393
Traditionally, divisions of marital property have been effected ac-
cording to the procedure first enunciated in Wanberg v. Wanberg.394
This process involves three stages. First, the court must determine
which assets constitute marital property available for distribution.395
Second, the court must undertake a factual determination with respect
to the value of the property.396 Finally, the court must ensure that the
property is distributed equitably between the parties. 397 Upon appeal
to a higher court, the first and third steps are reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard,398 while the second step may be reversed only
upon a finding of clear error.399
This year, however, in Rose v. Rose, 4o the court affirmed a lower
court ruling that recognized an alternate form of property distribution
389. Id. at 751.
390. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A)(f) (1982).
391. 755 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1988).
392. See id.; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 754 P.2d 1333 (Alaska 1988).
393. Hilliker, 755 P.2d at 1112. See also Rhodes, 754 P.2d at 1335 ($60,000 ali-
mony award unnecessary when marital assets are large enough to make favorable
compensatory award to spouse).
394. 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983). Accord Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121, 1123
(Alaska 1988); Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988).
395. Wanberg 664 P.2d at 570.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. With respect to inclusion of property, see Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343
(Alaska 1988) (not an abuse of discretion to find that property was fully includable in
marital property, even though only 16.8% of it had been purchased with marital as-
sets). With respect to division of property, see Hayes v. Hayes, 756 P.2d 298 (Alaska
1988) (unequal division in wife's favor not an abuse of discretion because it was sup-
ported by factors identified in lower court's decision).
399. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 52(a).
400. 755 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1988).
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when the marriage is one of short duration and the parties' assets have
not been significantly comingled.401 In this situation, the trial court
may treat the property division as an action in rescission and attempt
to place the parties as near as possible to "the financial position they
would have occupied had no marriage taken place." 40 2
Most cases are still likely to be decided under the Wanberg analy-
sis and standards of review. With respect to the inclusion of assets in
the marital property, the court held in Matson v. Lewis403 that prop-
erty acquired in a previous divorce settlement was not part of the mar-
ital property in a subsequent divorce action.4° 4 However, it also held
that the use of such premarital assets as a down payment on property
purchased during the marriage evidenced an intent to treat the new
property fully as marital property and not partially in proportion to
the amount paid from marital assets.405
With respect to the accurate valuation of marital property, the
court established in Rice v. Rice40 6 that valuation is a factual determi-
nation that will not be held clearly erroneous if supported by the evi-
dence.40 7 The court routinely reversed and remanded valuation issues,
as in Hayes v. Hayes408 and Moffitt v. Moffitt,409 when it found no
evidentiary basis for the result due to the trial court's failure to state
any particular method in support of its valuation.410
Marital property is sometimes distributed in monthly or annual
payments, in which case it may be classified as alimony.411 If it is so
considered, the husband's obligation to pay ceases upon the wife's re-
marriage. 412 However, classification as a property distribution may
have other consequences. In Bryant v. Bryant,41 3 the court held that a
husband's military retirement pay, which may be attached to pay ali-
mony, could not be garnished to enforce a property settlement where
401. Id. at 1125.
402. Id.
403. 755 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1988).
404. Id. at 1127.
405. Id. at 1128.
406. 757 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1988).
407. Id. at 62. See also Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1988) (valua-
tion of Aniak property).
408. 756 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1988).
409. 749 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
410. Hayes, 756 P.2d at 300 (valuation of fox farm); Matson v. Lewis, 755 P.2d
1126, 1129 (Alaska 1988) (valuation of personal benefits); Moffitt, 749 P.2d at 347
(valuation of good will).
411. Bryant v. Bryant, 762 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Alaska 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 662(c) (1982), which defines alimony for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1982),
which prohibits garnishment of military retirement pay to satisfy a property
settlement).
412. Id.
413. 762 P.2d 1289 (Alaska 1988).
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the parties had not been married for at least ten years.414 Therefore, a
wife would be required to return any alimony payments previously
received which had been collected through garnishment. 415
C. Child Support
In Patch v. Patch,416 the court found that the amount of support a
parent must provide is not limited to his income417 and stated that
other assets of the parent may be considered in determining his ability
to continue a current level of child support payments despite a tempo-
rary reduction in his income.418 The court also held, in Rhodes v.
Rhodes,419 that it is not an abuse of discretion to establish child sup-
port payments based on a parent's earnings potential rather than on
his temporary minimal income.420
D. Attorneys' Fees
The general rule for the award of attorneys' fees is that they may
be awarded to the prevailing party in a proceeding. 421 However, for
divorce actions, the court held that the appropriate manner of as-
signing responsibility for fees was to consider "the relative economic
situation and earning power of each party."422 The court further held
that such an award "is discretionary with the trial judge and is review-
able on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. ''423
The court established a dichotomy with respect to fees in post-
settlement proceedings. In those cases concerning child support or
property division (money and property issues), attorneys' fees are
properly awarded under the prevailing party standard established in
414. Id. at 1292; Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1982); Computation of
Retired Pay Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) (1982).
415. Bryant, 762 P.2d at 1292. In Bryant, the husband sought a court order to halt
alimony payments upon the wife's remarriage. The payments had previously been
awarded from the husband's military retirement pay. When the wife contested the
order on the grounds that the alimony was in fact intended as property settlement and
not as support, she was thrust into a "Catch-22" situation, whereby if the payments
constituted property division, she was not entitled to receive them out of the military
pay, and if they represented alimony, she lost them due to her remarriage.
416. 760 l?.2d 526 (Alaska 1988).
417. Id. at 529.
418. Id. at 530.
419. 754 P.2d 1333 (Alaska 1988).
420. Id. at 1335.
421. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a).
422. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 754 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Alaska 1988). See also Hilliker v.
Hilliker, 755 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Alaska 1988) ("relative economic situations, their earn-
ing power, and such other factors as may be germane").
423. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895, 899 (Alaska 1988).
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Civil Rule 82.424 For proceedings involving custody and visitation
rights, however, such as L.L.Mv. P.M.,425 the prevailing party is enti-
tled only to "reasonable" attorneys' fees from the party who acted
"willfully and without just excuse. '426
E. Parental Rights
Three cases were decided this year which resulted in the termina-
tion of parental rights. In E.JS. v. State, DHSS,427 the court clearly
established a two-prong test for conditions justifying termination. For
a court to terminate a parent's association with his or her child, it
must first find that the child is a "child in need of aid."' 428 This may be
established by showing evidence of a complete disregard for parental
obligations resulting in the destruction of the parent-child relation-
ship.429 Second, the court must find that the parent's conduct creating
this condition is "likely to continue" 430 and justifies terminating the
parent's rights. The court reiterated this test in R. C. v. State,
DHSS,4 31 in which it also held that statutes regarding the termination
of parental rights are not unconstitutionally vague.432
The answers to these questions must be supported by the testi-
mony of qualified expert witnesses.433 Federal guidelines suggest that
such testimony must respond to two questions related to the above-
mentioned tests: (1) will the conduct cause serious emotional or physi-
cal harm to the child, and (2) can the parent be persuaded to change
such damaging conduct.434 In an issue of first impression, the court
held in Matter of Parental Rights of TO. 435 that it was not necessary
that one expert answer both questions; rather, the testimony of one or
more expert and lay witnesses may be aggregated to satisfy the test.436
424. Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1988); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82.
425. 754 P.2d 262 (Alaska 1988).
426. Id. at 264-65 (same standard as in action for failure to permit visitation);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.300 (1983).
427. 754 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988).
428. Id. at 750; ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
429. E.JS., 754 P.2d at 751.
430. Id. at 750.
431. 760 P.2d 501, 504 (Alaska 1988).
432. Id. at 506.
433. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1982).
434. 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67593 (1979) (cited in In re Parental Rights of T.O., 759
P.2d 1308, 1310 (Alaska 1988)).
435. 759 P.2d 1308 (Alaska 1988).
436. Id. at 1310-11.
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IX. FISH AND GAME LAW
During 1988, the court responded to numerous statutory and
constitutional challenges to decisions in the areas of fish and game law.
In Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing and Control Board,437 the
supreme court ruled, inter alia, that statutes granting guides exclusive
rights to lead hunts in certain areas438 are unconstitutional because
they violate Alaska's guarantee of common use of all fish, wildlife, and
water.439 Although a question of first impression for the court, its de-
cision was heavily influenced by a previously announced policy to "ap-
ply the common use clause [of the Alaska Constitution] in a way that
strongly protects public access to natural resources." 440
Another challenge under the Alaska Constitution arose in Johns
v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.441 In Johns the court's
primary holding that a limitation restricting the number of permits at
a non-distressed fishery to thirty-five was within the commission's au-
thority442 was constitutional443 and served the purposes of the Limited
Entry Act.444 However, the court did find error in the commission's
failure to set the optimum number of permits while applications were
still pending and remanded the case to superior court in accordance
with this finding.445
Another case involving the Limited Entry Act was Arkanakyak v.
State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.446 In Arkanakyak, the
court ruled that a permit applicant's statutory and constitutional chal-
lenges to the permit's denial were not ripe for judicial review because
appellant did not allege specifically that the commission's policy was
discriminatory. 447 Mrs. Arkanakyak asserted that the particular facts
437. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
438. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.54.040(a)(7), 08.54.195 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
439. Article VIII, section 3, of the Alaska Constitution provides: "Wherever oc-
curring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
common use." ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
440. Owsichek 763 P.2d at 492.
441. 758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1988).
442. Id. at 1260. The commission's authority is derived from the Limited Entry
Act. This Act was designed to limit entry into fisheries recognized or designated as
distressed or as requiring limitation of use in order to safeguard the economic welfare
of the state's fisheries. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-16.43.990 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
443. Johns, 758 P.2d at 1263. The commission's actions survived scrutiny under
the equal rights provisions of article I, § 1,and article VIII, § 17, of the Alaska Consti-
tution. Id.
444. Id. at 1263; ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-16.43.990 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
445. Johns, 758 P.2d at 1266.
446. 759 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1988).
447. Id. at 517.
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of her case warranted an exception to the general policy.448 The court
consequently remanded to the commission for further proceedings to
determine whether the plaintiff's special factual circumstances war-
ranted treating her as an exception to the commission's policy against
giving crew participation points to non-licensed members.449
Finally, in CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,45 0 the supreme court ad-
dressed the rights of a title holder to tidelands. The court held that
any state tideland conveyance which fails to satisfy the requirements
set forth in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois451 will be subject to
public easements for purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishery.452
In dismissing an action for trespass, the court further held that a state
conveyance to a private party pursuant to class I preference rights
under state statute453 (such as the conveyance to CWC's predecessor
in interest) is subject to such easements. 454
X. PROCEDURE
Since the cases in this section address numerous legal issues but
lack large numbers of cases in any one category, they will be presented
case by case. However, the cases will be discussed in the order that
the various issues would be encountered by an attorney during the
course of a typical case. The issues will be presented in the following
order: justiciability, venue, joinder, compulsory counterclaims, service
of process, discovery, jury trial, voir dire, statutes of limitations, and
court costs and attorneys' fees. Although in practice this sequence
varies from case to case, for purposes of this section the above order
serves as a basic guideline,
448. Mrs. Arkanakyak's specific argument was that she should be exempted from
the normal requirement that fishermen be licensed in order to obtain crew participa-
tion points because cultural and language barriers prevented her from learning the
legal requirements of commercial fishing. She likened her situation to that of a minor,
for whom the commission already recognizes an exemption. Id. at 516.
449. rd. at 517. For contrary arguments, see the dissenting opinion of Justices
Matthews and Burke. Id. at 517-18.
450. 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988).
451. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In construing the Illinois Central test, the CWCFisher-
ies court held as follows:
In determining whether a state conveyance has passed title to a parcel of
tideland free of any trust obligations under Illinois Central, we must ask,
first, whether the conveyance was made in furtherance of some specific pub-
lic trust purpose and, second, whether the conveyance can be made without
substantial impairment of the public's interest in state tidelands.... If either
of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, conveyance free of the
public trust would be permissible....
CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1119 (citations omitted).
452. Id. at 1118.
453. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.820 (1984).
454. CWCFisheries, 755 P.2d at 1121.
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Within the realm of justiciability, the case of Bowers Office Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. University of Alaska455 involved a question of ripeness.
Bowers challenged the University's competitive bid practices, alleging
that dissatisfied bidders ought to be granted full hearings on the valid-
ity of their grievances. 45 6 However, Bowers did not seek relief for its
own dispute but, rather, sought a prospective ruling which would af-
fect such bidders in the future.457 Because Bowers pleaded no case or
controversy, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's dismissal,
holding that even though Bowers may have suffered sufficient injury
by virtue of its reduced ability to bid effectively on future University
procurement contracts, the case was not ripe for adjudication since a
new "Procurement Code" had taken effect which created "an exclu-
sive remedy for 'interested parties' protesting the state's award of a
purchasing contract. ' 458 Until an injury arises under the new code,
there is no ripe controversy.45 9 While this decision is somewhat lim-
ited to its facts, the opinion contains an interesting and useful discus-
sion of the current state of the law of justiciability in Alaska,
particularly in demonstrating how Alaska courts have become "more
open to litigants than [have] federal courts. ''460
The court addressed venue in Ketchikan General Hospital v. Dun-
nagan,461 where it established rules for dealing with improperly situ-
ated cases. In Ketchikan, a complaint in negligence was filed in the
incorrect judicial district of the superior court.462 Nevertheless, the
superior court retained jurisdiction and venue. The decision was ap-
pealed to the supreme court, which held that the superior court had
improperly retained venue.463 The court stated further that when
faced with an improperly situated case, a superior court should trans-
fer the case to the proper district (where the claim arose and service
took place), and in instances of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff,
the superior court may dismiss the action entirely. 464 The court noted
that the plaintiff would have been free to file his complaint in the
proper district and move for a change of venue on grounds of forum
non conveniens. 465
455. 755 P.2d 1095 (Alaska 1988).
456. Id. at 1096.
457. Id. at 1098.
458. Id. at 1098-99.
459. Id. at 1099.
460. Id. at 1097.
461. 757 P.2d 57 (Alaska 1988).
462. The plaintiff's rationale for filing in the judicial district in question involved
the injured plaintiff's being hospitalized and consequently unable to attend trial in the
proper judicial district. Id. at 58.
463. Id at 59.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 59 n.6.
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Once properly in court, attorneys may encounter joinder
problems such as those in Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. State.466 In
Tesoro, the court affirmed a lower court ruling that denied Tesoro's
motion to intervene in a lawsuit between the state and the Amerada
Hess Corporation.467 The court did not address the question whether
such intervention would be appropriate under Civil Rule 24(a) or
24(b).468 Rather, the court based its opinion solely on a contract be-
tween Tesoro and the state which included a provision expressly
prohibiting Tesoro's intervention in the Amerada Hess litigation with-
out the state's consent, thereby waiving its ability to intervene in the
litigation pursuant to Civil Rule 24.469 Since the court found no mis-
representation or bad faith on the state's part, it gave the contractual
provision full force and effect and refused to allow Tesoro's
intervention.470
Miller v. LHKM471 involved the court's interpretation of the
compulsory counterclaim provision of Alaska Civil Rule 13.472 In
Miller, the court held generally that the plaintiff was prohibited from
litigating her claim (for breach of a joint venture agreement) because
she did not raise the issue as a compulsory counterclaim in a previous
litigation in which the parties were co-defendants. 473 Specifically, the
court held that (1) Miller's paving claim arose from the same transac-
tion as the original interpleader action itself (the aforementioned prior
litigation),474 and (2) once LHKM asserted a cross-claim against
Miller in the prior litigation, the parties became "opposing parties"
within the meaning of Rule 13 with respect to that claim.475 There-
fore, the compulsory counterclaim rule must be applied.
The court addressed the procedural issue of substituted service of
process in Beam v. Adams,476 a case which was essentially a damages
466. 757 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1988).
467. State v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 1JU 77-847 Civil (Juneau Super. Ct.)
(pending as of June 24, 1988).
468. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b).
469. Tesoro, 757 P.2d at 1048-49.
470. Id. at 1051-52.
471. 751 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1988).
472. Rule 13 of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, as follows:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. ...
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 13 (emphasis added).
473. Miller, 751 P.2d at 1359.
474. Id. at 1361.
475. Id. at 1359.
476. 749 P.2d 366 (Alaska 1988).
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suit involving a mortgagor's refusal to vacate premises after foreclo-
sure. The court, in construing the requirements of Alaska Civil Rule
4(d)(1) 47 7 for the first time, affirmed the lower court's ruling that ser-
vice at the mortgagor's former wife's residence was improper.478 The
court based its ruling on specific evidence that (1) it was not the mort-
gagor's residence, (2) no evidence was introduced to prove that the
mortgagor visited the residence after he relocated, and (3) no evidence
was introduced that the mortgagor had named his ex-wife as his agent
for purposes of receiving service of process.479 Therefore, none of the
requirements of Rule 4(d)(1) were met.
In Langdon v. Champion,480 the supreme court discussed the
work-product doctrine of discovery with respect to documents existing
in the files of Champion's insurance company. The court held that
such documents are not protected by the attorney-client privilege un-
less the insurer received them at the express behest of counsel for the
insured.4 81 In addition, the court noted that such documents are nor-
mally presumed to be outside the scope of the work-product doctrine
since they are prepared in the regular course of business. 4 2 However,
this presumption may be overcome by a showing that the materials
were prepared at the insured's attorney's request or under his or her
supervision.483 In a footnote, the court explained that, although these
materials may not be protected by the work-product doctrine, other
relevant discovery provisions may protect such materials
nevertheless. 484
Another discovery issue was confronted in Honda Motor Co. v.
Salzman,485 in which the court affirmed a ruling imposing liability on
477. Rule 4(d)(1) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(d) Summons-Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with
such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Individuals. Upon an individual other than an infant or an in-
competent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to him personally, or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
478. Beam, 749 P.2d at 367.
479. Id. at 369.
480. 752 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1988).
481. Id. at 1004.
482. Id. at 1006.
483. Id. at 1007.
484. Id. at 1007 n.14.
485. 751 P.2d 489 (Alaska), cert. dismissed, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 20 (1988).
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Honda as a sanction for noncompliance with discovery. Such a mea-
sure may seem extreme in light of the existing policy that any discov-
ery sanction that operates to establish an element of the offense to be
considered established must be sufficiently related to the withheld in-
formation.486 However, the court's decision was based on several im-
portant factors. First, Honda's delay and noncompliance with the
discovery process was itself extreme.4 87 Second, the sanction is closely
tailored to the misconduct because the documents which Honda re-
fused to present were the very documents Salzman would have needed
to prove the key elements of liability.4 8
In Sparks v. Gustafson,48 9 which is substantively discussed in the
property section of this note,490 the court discussed the standards for
granting a continuance. In denying a continuance to a party seeking
additional time for discovery, the court cited the principle that "[a]
continuance based on the absence of evidence is properly refused if the
applicant failed to use due diligence to produce the evidence by testi-
mony, deposition, or other method." 491
Waiver of the right to jury trial was addressed in Frank v. Golden
Valley Electric Association, Inc. 492 The court held that the failure to
fie jury instructions within the deadline set forth in the pretrial order
does not, in and of itself, amount to a waiver of the right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.493 Alaska Civil Rule 38,
which discusses the right to trial by jury, provides for specific circum-
stances that will amount to waiver.494 However, Alaska Civil Rule 51,
which discusses jury instructions, makes no mention of waiver of the
right to jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply. 495 Therefore, the
court found that a late filing of jury instructions did not warrant a
waiver of the right to trial by jury.496 However, the court carefully
noted that this holding is narrowly tailored and should not be read as
indicating that a trial court may never reasonably imply a waiver of
486. Id. at 493.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. 750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988).
490. See infra text accompanying notes 573-76.
491. Sparks, 750 P.2d at 341. The court held that a delay of 18 months before
requesting information when the party had two years to prepare constituted a failure
to pursue discovery in a timely fashion. Id.
492. 748 P.2d 752 (Alaska 1988).
493. Id. at 753; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16.
494. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 38. The court in interpreting Civil Rule 38(d) noted spe-
cifically that "the right to trial by jury (1) is waived by a party's failure to make a
timely demand for jury trial as required under Civil Rule 38(b), and (2) may be im-
pliedly waived by a party's failure to appear at trial." Frank 748 P.2d at 754.
495. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 51.
496. Frank, 748 P.2d at 755.
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the right to jury trial from a party's post-order conduct.497 In fact, the
court detailed examples of misrepresentation and acquiescence which
would rise to the level of waiver. 498
The supreme court reviewed a challenge to a trial court's refusal
to excuse jurors who admitted bias but who later made good faith
statements that they would be impartial in Sirotiak v. H. C. Price Co. 499
The court refused to adopt the standard urged by appellants that once
bias has been admitted, the court must be convinced that the jurors'
impartiality is "unequivocal and absolute." 5° Rejecting this standard
as intruding on the court's discretion, the court held, "All that is re-
quired of a prospective juror is a good faith statement that he or she
will be fair, impartial and follow instructions."501 Applying this stan-
dard to Sirotiak, the court held, inter alia, that the trial court's refusal
to excuse two jurors for cause was not harmful error, even though the
jurors expressed predispositions regarding inflated tort judgments, be-
cause the jurors stated that they would hear the case impartially and
follow the judge's instructions. 50 2
In Powers v. State, Public Employees Retirement Board, 503 the
supreme court upheld a lower court finding that Mr. Powers' appeal
from an administrative decision was time-barred by the thirty-day
statute of limitations found in Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). 5 4 The rule
requires an appeal to be filed no later than thirty days from the date on
which the order being appealed is mailed or delivered to the appel-
lant.50 5 Powers received notice of the board's decision on December 4,
1986, but did not file his appeal until January 9, 1987. He argued,
however, that the board's decision was not the final order being ap-
pealed since the board must "submit its finding to the administra-
tor."' 50 6 Powers read this as a requirement that the administrator rule
on the submitted findings. Since the administrator had not so ruled,
Powers argued that the statute had not begun to run.50 7 The court
497. Id. at 756.
498. Id. (citing Howard S. Lease Construction v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712, 719-20
(Alaska 1988); Gregoire v. National Bank of Alaska, 413 P.2d 27, 41-42 (Alaska
1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 923 (1966)).
499. 758 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1988).
500. Id. at 1276. The appellants' position has been adopted by several jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976); Auriemme
v. State, 501 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. App. 1986); State v. Land, 478 S.W.2d 290, 292-93
(Mo. 1972); Williams v. State; 565 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
501. Sirotia4 758 P.2d at 1277.
502. Id.
503. 757 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1988).
504. Id. at 68; ALASKA R. App. P. 602(a)(2).
505. ALASKA R. APp. P. 602(a)(2).
506. Powers, 757 P.2d at 67; ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.040 (1987).
507. Powers, 757 P.2d at 67.
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rejected this analysis, citing a board regulation that provides, "the
written decision of the Board is the final administrative decision re-
quired for purposes of appeal to the superior court. '50 8
Justice Rabinowitz dissented, arguing that the rule ought to have
been relaxed in this instance for several reasons, including the fact that
there was confusion about the procedure, the fact that the appeal was
only four days late, and the fact that the state was not disadvantaged
by the delay.509
The supreme court was faced with a problematic application of
Alaska Civil Rule 68 in Taylor Construction Services, Inc. v. URS
Co. 10 The rule involves settlement offers and provides, in pertinent
part, that "if the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the making of the offer."'511
The evenly divided court affirmed a lower court ruling that im-
posed the "penal costs" rule on the plaintiffs for failing to obtain a
judgment more favorable than an earlier settlement offer.5 12 The re-
sult of the lower court ruling was to increase the amount of damages
paid to defendants on their counterclaim and additionally to award the
defendants attorneys' fees and court costs. 513 The supreme court af-
firmed, holding that the judgment obtained was not more favorable
than the settlement offer,514 and that the lower court was within its
discretion in awarding greater attorneys' fees than are usually allowed
for in the schedule.515 The apparent effect of this holding is to
broaden the ambit of Civil Rule 68 by interpreting the language to
include the net effect of counterclaims on the final recovery when the
dropping of those counterclaims is a condition of the settlement offer.
508. 2 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, ADMIN. CODE § 35.180 (eff. Oct. 21, 1983).
509. Powers, 757 P.2d at 68 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
510. 758 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1988).
511. Id. at 101 (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68(b)(1)).
512. Taylor, 758 P.2d at 101.
513. Id.
514. Indeed, the question of whether the judgment obtained was more favorable
than the settlement offer was the main issue on appeal because the defendants offered
to settle the case for $700,000.00, including an agreement to drop their counterclaim.
The actual judgment which the plaintiff received at trial was for $162,000.00, but the
plaintiff was found liable on the counterclaim in the amount of $223,700.00. Id. at
100.
515. Id. at 102. The schedule referred to is set forth in Civil Rule 82(a), and it is to
be adhered to "[u]nless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs." ALASKA R.
Civ. P. 82(a)(1).
1989]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
XI. PROPERTY
The court's decisions in the area of property and real estate law
frequently are resolved on other grounds, such as contract law or civil
procedure. The substantive property issues may be divided into the
following categories: eminent domain, covenants, title, accountings,
probate and estates, natural resources, and miscellaneous.
A. Eminent Domain
Typically, when the state takes a private individual's land in a
condemnation proceeding, it deposits the estimated just compensation
with the court for the benefit of the landowner. 516 The individual may
withdraw any portion of this amount pending final determination of
the compensation due.51 7 If the condemnee fails, through his own de-
lay, to withdraw the funds, he is not entitled to receive interest on the
deposit.518 In Hofstad v. State,519 the court held that requiring the
condemnee to return with interest any amounts withdrawn in excess of
the final stipulation does not place him in "double jeopardy" because
the individual has the option of placing the money in an interest bear-
ing account to provide for any repayment. 520
One factor that must be considered in determining just compensa-
tion is the use of the property taken. When a single tract of property is
"split-zoned," 521 the compensation may be dependent upon the per-
mitted use for each particular zone. 522 In a case that presented more
of a zoning issue than an eminent domain question, the court in Bocek
Brothers v. Municipality ofAnchorage 523 held that "use district bound-
aries should be respected even where they do not coincide with lot
boundaries." 524 The court refused to award enhanced damages for an
increased industrial taking, finding that where property was zoned
two-thirds industrial and one-third residential, off-street parking and/
or loading was not permitted in the residential section to serve the
needs of the industrial usage of the property.525
516. See Hofstad v. State, 763 P.2d 1351, 1351 (Alaska 1988).
517. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.440(b) (1983).
518. Hofstad v. State, 763 P.2d 1351, 1352 (Alaska 1988).
519. 763 P.2d 1351 (Alaska 1988).
520. Id. at 1352-53.
521. "Split-zoned" property is that which is zoned for more than one use. 2 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.12 (3d ed. 1986).
522. Boceck Bros. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 750 P.2d 335 (Alaska 1988).
523. 750 P.2d 335 (Alaska 1988).
524. Id. at 338.
525. Id. at 337. The court construed Anchorage Municipal Code section
21.40.040(K) to mean that parking in R-2 residential districts is prohibited "unless
associated with a permitted R-2 use." Id. (citing ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL
CODE § 21.40.040(k) (1983)).
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The court further addressed the adequacy of compensation in
0. 958 Acres, More or Less v. State, 526 discussing the rights of a con-
demnee who has forfeited land abutting a public highway. The court
held that while an abutter owns "a right of reasonable access" to an
existing highway, the right ordinarily does not extend to a newly con-
structed highway. 527 Rather, the taking of a section line easement is
compensable only if it "deprives the landowner of reasonable access to
the network of streets to which it previously had access. z528 The court
held that an analysis of reasonable access includes an examination of
the potential uses of the property as well as of all the roads that actu-
ally or potentially lead to the property.5 29
Attorneys' fees in eminent domain proceedings are awarded
under Civil Rule 72(k).5 30 Courts generally will award fees only when
"necessary to achieve a just and adequate compensation of the
owner. '531 In State, Department of Transportation v. 4.085 Acres,532
the court extended this standard to instances where the state appeals
the master's allowance but the landowner does not.533 In evaluating
the propriety of attorneys' fees in this situation, courts should consider
any pre-judgment settlement offers by the state as well as the land-
owner's response. 534
B. Covenants
The court decided several cases regarding the enforceability of
restrictive covenants. These holdings are generally very fact-specific
and, for the most part, do not espouse any new principles of law. Each
addresses a different issue regarding the enforcement of covenants.
It is not necessary that an individual fully violate a restrictive
covenant before action may be taken to compel his conformity with its
terms. Lamoreux v. Langlotz535 involved an injunction to bar con-
struction of a home which would allegedly violate the minimum size
requirements of a restrictive covenant. The court upheld the injunc-
tion, ruling that the suit to enforce the covenant was not premature or
526. 762 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1988).
527. Id. at 99.
528. Id. at 100.
529. Id. at 101.
530. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 72(k).
531. Id. See State, Dep't of Transp. v. 4.085 Acres, 752 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Alaska
1988) ("court may only award fees necessarily incurred"); Bocek Bros. v. Municipal-
ity of Anchorage, 750 P.2d 335, 338 (Alaska 1988) (interest on attorneys' fees is not
necessary).
532. 752 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1988).
533. Id. at 1010.
534. Id. at 1011.
535. 757 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1988).
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unripe simply because the defendant had two years to bring the build-
ing within the requirements.5 36 Rather, in the context of enforcing
restrictive covenants, it is proper to bring suit for injunctive or declar-
atory relief as soon as someone begins to build in violation of the cove-
nant.537 In fact, any delay could potentially bar the suit under the
affirmative defense of laches.538
The court addressed the requirements for abandonment of a cove-
nant in B.B.P. Corp. v. Carroll.5 3 9 Generally, "a covenant will be
deemed abandoned when the evidenbe reveals substantial and general
noncompliance. ' ' 540 These conditions may be met when full compli-
ance is impossible and substantial compliance is extremely burden-
some, coupled with the fact that a covenant has neither been complied
with nor enforced.5 41 In Carroll, a suit to enforce a covenant requiring
the cutting of certain types of trees on residential lots was defeated
because the covenant had been abandoned.5 42
The court also decided two cases which specifically addressed the
application of particular rules and covenants. In the first, O'Buck v.
Cottonwood Village Condominium Association, 543 the court upheld the
rights of a condominium unit to adopt and enforce rules banning the
mounting of television antennae on the exterior of the buildings.5 44
Finding that the Association's "Declaration of Condominium"
authorized such rulemaking for the purposes of protecting the struc-
ture and preserving a uniform exterior appearance,5 45 the court ap-
plied a balancing test to determine whether the rule was reasonable.
In balancing the importance of the rule's purpose against the impor-
tance of the interest infringed upon, that is, the financial burden of
paying for cable service, the court held that the rule was reasonable. 546
The court also held that the condominium contract and prior use of an
antenna by the owner did not create a statutory easement, implied
easement, or easement by estoppel for continued use.5 47
536. Id. at 586.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 585-86.
539. 760 P.2d 519 (Alaska 1988).
540. Id. at 524.
541. Id.
542. Id. The court also held that a covenant requiring downhill lot owners to cut
trees obstructing uphill owners' views has not been abandoned. Id.
543. 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988).
544. Id. at 814.
545. Id. at 815. The court stated that the absence of a provision expressly author-
izing the right to ban antennae was not fatal to the Association's right to do so to
accomplish its other goals. Id. at 816.
546. Id. at 818.
547. Id. at 819-21. Regarding statutory easements, see ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.170
(1985). Regarding implied easements, see Freightways Terminal Co. v. Industrial and
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Finally, in Jones v. Brown, 54 8 the court interpreted a covenant
that restricted structures in a given neighborhood to single family
dwellings that were either "one story or split level in design" to impose
a height restriction on residences rather than a design restriction.5 49
While a home may appear to contain more than one level, so long as it
is within the applicable height range, it will survive a challenge for
breach of covenant.550
C. Title
Disputes frequently arise over who legally holds title to a particu-
lar piece of land. Although written agreements are considered the
norm for ascertaining the true owner, oral contracts may sometimes be
enforced under the full performance exception to the Statute of
Frauds.5 51 For example, in Carter v. Hoblit, 55 2 three individuals orally
agreed to purchase land jointly; however, Hoblit, the actual purchaser,
took the deed in his name alone.553 In reversing a summary judgment
which had awarded the entire tract to Hoblit, the court held, inter alia,
that the agreement could not be held invalid under the Statute of
Frauds5 54 because each party rendered full performance (payment of
the purchase price), which was accepted by Hoblit in accordance with
the contract.55 5 In addition, the court found that sufficient evidence
existed to determine the extent of Hoblit's breach and the appropriate
remedies owed the other two parties.55 6
Commercial Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977, 988 (Alaska 1963) (to be implied, easement
must be "reasonably necessary for beneficial enjoyment of the property"). For equita-
ble estoppel, oral grant and reliance are required. O'Buck 750 P.2d at 820 (quoting
Freightways, 381 P.2d at 984). In O'Buck, the same purpose could be achieved
through cable installation, and the plaintiff was compensated for the value of the an-
tenna; therefore, recovery was not permitted on these grounds. Id. at 820.
548. 748 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1988).
549. Id. at 749.
550. Id.
551. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020(1) (1983).
552. 755 P.2d 1084 (Alaska 1988).
553. Id. at 1085. The parties never executed a written contract to purchase the
land jointly, but each fully paid his share of the purchase price. Id.
554. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (1983).
555. Carter, 755 P.2d at 1088-89. The court cited Alaska Statutes section
09.25.020(1), an exception to the Statute of Frauds. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020(1)
(1983). This exception was not codified at the time of the agreement but was recog-
nized by decisional law in Rassmus v. Cary, 11 Alaska 456, 462 (1947). Carter, 755
P.2d at 1088.
556. Carter, 755 P.2d at 1089.
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Foster v. State557 involved an interpretation of the Land Registra-
tion Law. 5 8 This law required landowners to register title to real
property; fidlure to register resulted in imposition of a fine and possible
foreclosure on the property by the state.5 59 In Foster, the court ad-
dressed the ownership of land foreclosed upon by the Territory of
Alaska in 1957.560 While the original record holder may repurchase
the property for the nominal amount of the foreclosure judgment,561
he must first establish a perfect chain of title leading to himself 5 62
Absent such a showing, repurchase is precluded and the state retains
title, as it did in this case.563 The court further held that a person
cannot acquire state land by adverse possession.564
D. Accountings
Issues often reach the court respecting the calculation of damage
awards or settlements over which the litigants disagree. In Gaudiane
v. Lundgren, 565 the court determined the appropriate means to calcu-
late an individual's share of profits in a leasing transaction where the
individual became a party to the transaction by exercising an option to
acquire a twenty-five percent interest in the property.5 66 The court
held that by exercising the option, the individual (Gaudiane) assumed
the position he would have occupied had he been an original partici-
pant in the transaction.5 67 Therefore, in an accounting, he was not
entitled to early receipt of future installments due on a note to
557. 752 P.2d 459 (Alaska 1988).
558. Ch. 134, 1953 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.10.010-34.10.240, repealed by Act, ch. 182, § 20, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws). The
court found two purposes of the law: to determine ownership of remote parcels and to
return abandoned land to the state. Foster, 752 P.2d at 460. Although the Land Re-
gistration Law was repealed in 1978, the cases respecting ownership of land previously
foreclosed upon pursuant to the Land Registration Law are decided under its provi-
sions. Id. at 459.
559. Foster; 752 P.2d at 460. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.10.040, 34.10.050,
34.10.080-.130 (1985).
560. Foster; 752 P.2d at 460.
561. Foster, 752 P.2d at 460; ALASKA STAT. § 34.10.220. This provision remained
in effect until 1983.
562. Foster; 752 P.2d at 462.
563. Id. at 463. The court found that the denial of title in this case was supported
by adequate relevant evidence. Id.
564. Id. at 464; ALASKA STAT. § 38.95.010 (1984). A second individual sought
title to the land by virtue of adverse possession. Foster, 752 P.2d at 463. The claim-
ant's assertion that the initial foreclosure was void and title rested with a private indi-
vidual rather than the state was barred under the doctrine of laches. Id. at 465-66.
565. 754 P.2d 742 (Alaska 1988).
566. Id. at 743.
567. Id. at 744. Gaudiane exercised his option coincidentally with the sale of the
property to a third party. Id. at 743.
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purchase the property, but he was instead required to wait until the
installments came due.568
The court also addressed the question of who bears the burden of
justifying expenses in an accounting between tenants in common.
Generally, the managing co-tenant, who keeps the books and controls
day-to-day management, bears the burden of proof as to the accuracy
of the accounting because that party "controls the evidence which
bears upon that fact."'569 In Sloan v. Jefferson,570 the court applied
this principle and reversed the findings of the trial court, holding in
favor of a non-managing tenant who provided testimony and affidavits
while the managing co-tenant produced no reliable evidence.5 71
E. Probate and Estates
In Sparks v. Gustafson, 5 72 the court addressed the issue of unjust
enrichment with respect to compensation awarded to the friend of a
decedent who managed a portion of the decedent's estate. Ruling that
the estate would be unjustly enriched if it received a benefit without
compensating the donor for its value, the court held that compensa-
tion is equitable when the benefit is not given gratuitously and the
donor expects payment for his efforts. 573 Addressing for the first time
what constituted "gratuitous intent," the court suggested that services
rendered by a close friend or relation that were not necessary to main-
tain the beneficiary's status quo were representative of gratuitous do-
nations.5 74 Finding that management and maintenance services are
"business services for which one would ordinarily expect to be paid"
and therefore typically not given gratuitously, the court awarded com-
pensation to the donor.5 75
F. Natural Resources
The court decided two cases in 1988 which addressed the issue of
ownership of minerals and mining rights. In Hayes v. Alaska Juneau
568. Id. at 744. In addition, he was responsible for 25% of the title clearing ex-
penses incidental to the sale of the property.
569. Sloan v. Jefferson, 758 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1988) (citing Holcomb v. Davis,
431 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1968); Dixon v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1394, 1396
(Okla. 1972)).
570. 758 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
571. Id. at 85. The court is free to reverse the findings of a trial court that rejected
the findings of the master. Id. (citing Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d
504, 509 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of Martinsville v. Cobler, 215 Va. 852, 213 S.E.2d
800, 802 (1975)).
572. 750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988).
573. Id. at 342.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 343.
1989]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Forest Industries, Inc., 576 the court determined the rightful ownership
of certain minerals contained in mine tailings (residual ore deposits
remaining after most minerals have been extracted) 577 that had been
deposited on certain tidal and submerged lands owned by the State of
Alaska. The predecessor company to the defendant had dumped the
tailings for the purpose of disposal.578 Stating that "[w]here mine tail-
ings are deposited for purpose of disposal, [they] are considered re-
alty," 579 the court ruled that the tailings belonged to the state because
they had been "deposited in such a manner... that they become real
estate, ' 580 thereby becoming the property of the owner of the underly-
ing land.58 1
Kile v. Belisle 582 addressed the issues of abandonment and forfei-
ture with respect to ownership of mining claims. Regarding abandon-
ment, the court found that when a claimant abandons a claim and
later attempts to quitclaim his interest to another party, claimants
under his deed have no title because he has no valid interest to con-
vey. 58 3 In a related claim, the court held with respect to forfeiture that
orders withdrawing lands from a claim site divest the rights of all
claimants who have not substantially complied with annual assess-
ment requirements. 584 With regard to part two of the holding, the
court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hickel v.
Oil Shale Corp.,585 which "suggests that, in any withdrawal context,
claims which are not in substantial compliance with the annual work
requirement are divested. '586
G. Miscellaneous
The court addressed the issue of replatting vacated public lands in
Grand v. Municipality of Anchorage.5 87 Anchorage developed a plan
to improve Merrill Field Airport which included a provision calling
576. 748 11.2d 332 (Alaska 1988).
577. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (3d ed. 1969).
578. Id. at 333.
579. Id. at 336 (citing State v. A.J. Industries, 397 P.2d 280, 284 (Alaska 1964)).
580. Id. (citing Steinfeld v. Omega Copper Co., 16 Ariz. 230, 141 P. 847, 848
(1914)).
581. Id. at 337. In this case, the state was the owner of the underlying land. Id. at
336. The court also noted that tailings may become real estate through abandonment,
intention, or adaption and use. Id.
582. 759 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1988).
583. Id. at 1297. The court noted that the test for abandonment requires "a subjec-
tive intent to abandon coupled with an external and objective act by which that intent
is carried into effect." Id. at 1296.
584. Id. at 1301.
585. 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
586. Kile, 759 P.2d at 1298.
587. 753 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1988).
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for vacation of two feeder taxiways that abutted Grand's property588
Grand opposed the original replat because, despite the additional land
awarded him, it impinged on his construction plans by essentially re-
ducing the size of his usable space. 589 The municipality then drafted a
revised replat which excluded Grand altogether and awarded the va-
cated feeder taxiways in full to the other adjoining leaseholders. 590
Citing a provision of the Anchorage Municipal Code which provides
that "title to... public right-of-way vacated on a plat attaches to the
lot or lands bordering on the area in equal proportions.. .,,s91 the
court found that Grand was entitled to his proportionate share of the
vacated taxiways and ordered an amendment of the final replat.5 92
Wassink v. Hawkins593 addressed the state's ability to terminate a
land sale contract with the purchasers of a dairy farm. The parties
had previously agreed to a stipulation that extended the deadline for
compliance with the terms of the contract and bound the purchasers
to waive "any and all defenses" in the event of an alleged breach. 594
The court refused to find the stipulation invalid under a theory of eco-
nomic duress or contract of adhesion. 595 However, the court did con-
clude that the waiver of "any and all defenses" did not constitute a
waiver of defenses arising after the stipulation was signed, such as
frustration or estoppel, and held that sufficient evidence existed to
raise genuine issues of material fact regarding these defenses.5 96
XII. TAX LAW
The tax cases before the court in 1988 involved both state and
local tax regulations and covered both personal and corporate taxation
issues. Most interesting in the corporate field are two cases involving
apportionment of worldwide income under the unitary business con-
cept. Although the cases were not factually similar, the court gener-
ally ruled in favor of revenue enhancement, except in a case of
discriminatory taxation by a local government. The court ruled in
favor of the state in all four of the tax cases that the court decided.
The most complex tax case in 1988 was Gulf Oil Corp. v. State,
Department of Revenue. 5 9 7 Gulf challenged the Department of Reve-
nue's determination of the company's worldwide income for state tax
588. Id. at 141.
589. Id. at 142.
590. Id. at 143.
591. Id. (citing ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 21.14.130(D)(1)).
592. Id.
593. 763 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1988).
594. Id. at 972.
595. Id. at 973-74.
596. Id. at 975.
597. 755 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1988).
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purposes for the years 1975-1977. At issue was whether extraordina-
rily high income taxes paid to OPEC contries were, in fact, income
taxes or taxes based on imputed income and therefore inconsistent
with "income taxes" as used in the Alaska statute.598 The Department
of Revenue argued that the tax payments were income taxes as in-
tended by the statute and therefore were not deductible from Gulf's
worldwide income for purposes of applying Alaska's apportionment
formula.599 The court agreed with the state and ruled that despite the
fact that the taxes were extremely high, they fell within the meaning of
the statute and were not deductible from worldwide income.600 Gulf
attempted to bolster its argument by citing the Internal Revenue
Code6° 1 and its definition of foreign income taxes. However, the court
summarily dismissed this argument as inapplicable to this state taxa-
tion case.602
The second issue with regard to the apportionment formula was
the value of various leaseholds belonging to Gulf. Gulf argued that
leaseholds that turned out to be dry should be valued at zero since
they contributed nothing to Gulf's business in Alaska. However, the
court rejected this argument.603 Relying on its decision in State, De-
partment of Revenue v. Amoco, 604 the court noted that the dry leases
were in fact a contributing portion of an oil company's property due to
the necessity of exploration in determining which fields will pro-
duce.605 Upon further analysis, the court also determined that Gulf's
constitutional right of due process was not violated, as the taxpayer
598. Id. at 373; ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.031(c) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
599. Justice Moore's opinion reviews worldwide formula apportionment in detail.
The excellent synopsis is written in such a way that the attorney or lay person, with-
out significant tax knowledge, can understand the application of the formula. The
formula itself computes the proprotionate share of the company's worldwide income
subject to Alaska taxation. This figure is determined by averaging three factors: "the
proportion of the compnay's property located in Alaska, the proportion of the tax-
payer's payroll which is paid in Alaska, and the proportion of the taxpayer's sales that
occur in state," multiplied by the taxpayer's worldwide income. GulfOil, 755 P.2d at
374-75.
600. Id. at 379.
601. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 901 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
602. Id. at 279-80; ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.20.031(c), 43.20.036(a) (1983 & Supp.
1988).
603. Gulf Oil, 755 P.2d at 387.
604. 676 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1984) (holding that Amoco's non-producing leaseholds
were "used" for purposes of relevant statute because exploration is an integral part of
discovery process; consequently, leaseholds have value apart from production
capabilities).
605. Gulf Oil, 755 P.2d at 385.
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did not meet its burden of proof of providing "'clear and cogent evi-
dence' that the income attributed to the State is in fact 'out of all ap-
propriate proportions to the business transacted... in that State,' or
has 'led to a grossly distorted result.' "606
This holding represents a strong endorsement by the court of the
worldwide apportionment method of determining state income taxes
and a continued willingness to apply the formula strictly, despite dicta
by the United States Supreme Court that apportionment can lead to
inequities and that it is difficult to achieve a proper allocation. 60 7
In another case relating to apportionment, the court in Alaska
Gold Co. v. State, Department of Revenue 60 8 interpreted the standard
for applying the unitary business concept for the purposes of applying
Alaska's unitary apportionment formula. 60 9 Alaska Gold objected to
the Department of Revenue's inclusion of an out-of-state subsidiary of
a common parent as a member of its unitary group for tax purposes.610
The taxpayer argued that the parent was involved in two separate uni-
tary groups, one with itself and another with the out-of-state subsidi-
ary. The court disagreed and applied the reasoning it had used
in Earth Resources Company of Alaska v. State, Department of
Revenue. 611
In Earth Resources, the court set forth a standard of review for
the Department of Revenue's application of the unitary business con-
cept. Although the state urged the court to apply a rational basis stan-
dard of review in the Alaska Gold case, the court refused and
reiterated the substitution of judgment standard of review, while still
giving weight to the administrative decision. 612 The court further ap-
plied Earth Resources by requiring that the taxpayer must prove the
disputed entity was operating autonomously and independently.613
Unity will be found if "functional integration" can be established and
centralization of management is shown.614 The court did find unity
and therefore ruled that the apportionment formula was correctly
applied.615
606. Id. at 387 (quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170
(1983)).
607. Id. at 383 (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983);
Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968)).
608. 754 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1988).
609. The apportionment formula is discussed in GulfOil at length. See supra note
599.
610. Alaska Gold, 754 P.2d at 250.
611. Id. at 250, 253; 665 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1983).
612. Earth Resources, 665 P.2d at 965.
613. Alaska Gold, 754 P.2d 251-53.
614. Id. at 967 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458
U.S. 354, 364 (1982)).
615. Alaska Gold, 754 P.2d at 251.
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The significance of Alaska Gold lies in the reiteration of the sub-
stitution-ofjudgment standard. While the United States Supreme
Court has taken a "non-interventionist" stance on issues such as this,
the Alaska Supreme Court has been aggressive in imposing its own
judgment in these situations. 616
In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Board of
Equalization,617 the court interpreted state and local tax statutes618
and found that a developer, who had a twenty-three-year leasehold
interest in land as well as a twenty-year interest in the buildings and
improvements constructed thereon, had a "taxable interest" for the
purposes of the borough's real property taxation statutes. 619 The de-
veloper, who constructed a project on a federally owned military reser-
vation, had leased the land from the government. He subsequently
leased the project back to the government and was taxed on his inter-
ests in both the land and the buildings. He argued, inter alia, that he
enjoyed none of the rights of ownership and should, therefore, not be
taxed.620 Nevertheless, the supreme court upheld the lower court rul-
ing that Lomond had a taxable interest in both the land and the build-
ings.621 Specifically, the court found that the factual situation in this
case was covered by statutes which provide that, although property
owned by the government is exempt from taxation, private interests
therein are taxable to the extent of the interest.622
At issue in Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, Department of Com-
munity and Regional Affairs623 was a Kenai property tax ordinance
which taxed personal property at a higher rate than real property and
which also taxed oil and gas property at the higher personal property
rate. The court found the ordinance statutorily impermissible because
(1) by taxing personalty at a higher rate than realty, the borough vio-
lated former sections 29.53.010-29.53.180 of the Alaska Statutes, 624
which required a "uniform rate of levy on real and personal property
within a borough," and (2) the oil and gas distinction violated the in-
tent of a statute625 designed to prevent boroughs from shifting the
weight of taxation onto the shoulders of the oil and gas industry while
616. Id. at 250.
617. 760 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1988).
618. See ALASKA STAT. § 2 9.45.030(a)(1) (1986); FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOR-
OUGH, ALASKA, ORDINANCE § 3.08.020 (1988).
619. Ben Lomond, 760 P.2d at 513.
620. Id. at 511.
621. Id. at 513.
622. Id. at 511; ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(a)(1) (1986); FAIRBANKS NORTH
STAR BOROUGH, ALASKA, ORDINANCE § 3.08.020(c) (1988).
623. 751 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1988).
624. ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.53.010-29.53.180, repealed by Act, ch. 74, § 88, 1985
Alaska Sess. Laws.
625. Id. § 43.56.010(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
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relieving general property owners of a burden which is properly
theirs. 626
With regard to the first holding concerning taxation of personalty
at a higher rate, the court noted that the statute facially required only
that all property be assessed at its "true and full value. ' 62 7 The statute
did not expressly prohibit the taxing of assessed property at different
rates. However, the practical effect of the personalty/realty differen-
tial in this ordinance was to assess indirectly real property at less than
its "true and full value" 628 by nominally assessing it at full value, only
later to tax it at a lower rate.629 The court stated that, "What the
Borough cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly. '630 Furthermore,
the court found unpersuasive Kenai's challenges to the Department of
Community and Regional Affair's ("DCRA") actions on statutory en-
forcement theories and on constitutional grounds.631 Specifically, the
court concluded that (1) "setting the tax rate is a procedure subject to
DCRA's statutory enforcement authority, ' 632 and (2) "the Borough is
not a 'person' and therefore may not assert due process or equal pro-
tection claims against its creator, the State. ' 633
XIII. TORTS
The court decided a wide variety of personal tort claims in 1988
which have been broadly segregated into the following areas: mal-
practice, contribution and indemnification, negligence, libel, and mis-
cellaneous tort issues.
A. Malpractice
Perhaps the most significant development in malpractice law
came in the area of medical malpractice, where the court upheld the
constitutionality of Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536, which requires
mandatory pretrial review of malpractice claims by an expert advisory
panel and provides that the panel's report is admissible as evidence at
trial.634 In Keyes v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc., 635 the court ad-
dressed several claims of constitutional violations, holding first that
the statute does not impair the doctor's right to a jury trial 636 in that
626. Kenai, 751 P.2d at 16.
627. Id.
628. Id. at 16-17.
629. Id.
630. Id. at 17.
631. Id. at 17.
632. Id. at 18.
633. Id.
634. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
635. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
636. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16.
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the panel's report serves only as an evidentiary submission, equal to
that of other expert testimony, and not as a determination of
liability.637
With respect to due process, the statute passed muster on both
substantive and procedural grounds.638 Finding the review procedure
to be "a reasonable legislative response to a perceived crisis in medical
malpractice insurance rates," the court rejected a substantive due pro-
cess argument. 639 Procedurally, the statute satisfied due process con-
straints because it does not at all deprive the parties of their rights to
litigate fully the malpractice claim before a jury and to support, rebut,
or impeach the panel report.64° In addition, the statute itself contains
many procedural safeguards designed to protect the integrity of the
review hearing.64 '
The statute further withstood the contention that it violated the
principle of separation of powers by vesting judicial authority in non-
judicial personnel.642 Because the report serves only as an expert opin-
ion and not as a basis for entry of judgment, the panel is not entrusted
with any judicial power.643
Finally, the court denied the plaintiff's equal protection chal-
lenge.644 Citing its holding in Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage,645
which provided that the "'interest in redressing wrongs through the
judicial process' is only 'significant,' and an 'interest in suing a particu-
lar part ... is not fundamental,' -646 the court applied a low level of
scrutiny to the class of medical malpractice litigants and found that
the statute "bears a fair and substantial relation" to its purposes of
encouraging settlement and reducing litigation.647
The court addressed two claims of attorney malpractice in 1988.
In the first, Wettanen v. Cowper,648 the court addressed the issue of
whether an action for malpractice was a tort claim and subject to a
two-year statute of limitations649 or a breach of contractual obligation
to perform certain duties and subject to the six-year limitation on con-
tract actions.650 Holding that the complaint was of negligence and
637. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 346-51.
638. Id. at 352, 354-55; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
639. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 351-352.
640. Id. at 353.
641. Id. at 354. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(a), (e), (g), (h) (1983).
642. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 357; ALASKA CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
643. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 355-57.
644. Id. at 358; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
645. 669 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1983).
646. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 358 (quoting Wilson, 669 P.2d at 572).
647. Id. at 358.
648. 749 P.2d 362 (Alaska 1988).
649. Id. at 364; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
650. Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 364; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983).
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therefore subject to the two-year tort statute, the court barred the mal-
practice claim.651 It found that the statute begins to run when the
client is actually harmed, which is deemed to be when judgment has
been entered against him, and is not postponed until the client learns
the full extent of the damages.652
The second attorney malpractice case concerned the standards for
imposing liability for negligence. In order to hold an attorney liable
for malpractice, a court must find the attorney's acts to have been (1)
negligent, and (2) the proximate cause of harm to the client.6 53 In
Boyles v. Smith, 6 54 a malpractice claim stemming from a usury action
against the plaintiffs, the court held that issues of negligence and cau-
sation required findings of fact and therefore must be decided by a
jury.65 5 In addition, because the underlying transaction was not usuri-
ous on its face, the nature of the information conveyed by the client to
the attorney was held to be material. 656
The court also discussed an accountant's liability for malpractice
in making investment recommendations that were passed on to third
parties without his knowledge. In Selden v. Burnett, 6 57 the court held
that an action for negligence lies only when the accountant owes the
third party investor a duty of care.658 Recognizing the broad duty
owed when an accountant certifies financial statements that are avail-
able generally to the public, the court imposed a more limited obliga-
tion when an accountant provides personal tax advice in a private
capacity. 659 The court held that in the case of a verbal recommenda-
tion to a private client, the duty of care extends to third parties only if
the accountant intends such parties to rely on the recommendations
and only if such intent is known by the third parties. 660 Imposition of
any broader duty would be far too expansive and would unfairly pe-
nalize an accountant who would be forced to accept significant risk
without realizing the benefit of remuneration from unknown third
parties.661
651. Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 364-66.
652. Id. at 365.
653. Boyles v. Smith, 759 P.2d 518, 521 (Alaska 1988).
654. 759 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1988).
655. Id. at 520.
656. Id. at 520-21.
657. 754 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1988).
658. Id. at 259.
659. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 552, comment h, illustration
10 (1977).
660. Selden, 754 P.2d at 259.
661. Id. at 260.
1989]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
B. Contribution and Indemnification
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
("UCATA") 662 creates a right to pro rata contribution among joint
tortfeasors. Therefore, if an insurance company pays a claim in full, it
is entitled to contribution from all those adjudged liable. In Provi-
dence Washington Insurance Co. v. McGee, 663 the court held that "a
claim for contribution is substantively separate from the underlying
tort and does not arise until the contribution claimant has paid more
than his or her proportionate share of the total claim." 664 It is, there-
fore, not a compulsory counterclaim and would not be barred under
Civil Rule 1.3(a). 665
The court addressed a more narrow issue of contribution in
Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian.666 The UCATA also pro-
vides that when a plaintiff gives a release or covenant not to sue to one
or more joint tortfeasors, the claim against the others must be reduced
by the greater of (1) the amount stipulated in the settlement, or (2) the
amount actually recovered.6 67 In this case, one tortfeasor settled and
gave a release; a second tortfeasor agreed to a consent judgment and
assigned his rights against his insurer to the injured party.66 8 The
court held that, like a formal release, an assignment of rights requires
a reduction in the claim against the remaining tortfeasor by the full
amount of the consent judgment, not the amount actually recovered
from the insurance company.6 69
In 1986, the Alaska Legislature enacted the Tort Reform Act (the
"Act"), which provided for joint liability among tortfeasors according
to fault.670 Faced with the question of whether the Act repealed the
UCATA, the court, in Ogle v. Craig Taylor Equipment Co., 671 held
that the Act applies only to cases where the plaintiff's injury occurred
on or after June 11, 1986, the Act's effective date.672 All other claims
are subject. to joint and several contribution, irrespective of degree of
fault under the UCATA. 673
662. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-09.16.060 (1983).
663. 764 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1988).
664. Id. at 715.
665. Id.; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 13(a). This rule requires all counterclaims arising out
of the occurrence that is the basis of the opposing party's claim either to be joined in
the pleadings or forfeited.
666. 754 P.2d 243 (Alaska 1988).
667. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983).
668. Tommy's Elbow Room, 754 P.2d at 244.
669. Id. at 246-47. This holding assumes the recovery will not exceed the amount
of the stipulation.
670. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Supp. 1988).
671. 761 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1988).
672. Id. at 725.
673. Id. See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020(1) (1983).
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In an action for strict products liability, the appropriate means of
assigning liability is indemnification, not contribution.674 In Koehring
Manufacturing v. Earthmovers of Fairbanks,675 the court held that a
lessor or retailer found liable on a strict products liability theory may
obtain indemnity from the manufacturer so long as he is not judged to
be independently negligent.676 Therefore, absent a pleading of the les-
sor's negligence as an affirmative defense, the manufacturer will be
held liable in an indemnification action.677 The manufacturer in this
case was required to indemnify the lessor for attorneys' fees from the
date the plaintiff's negligence claim was abandoned and the cause of
action proceeded under a strict liability theory.6 78
Another indemnification action, Schnabel Lumber Co., Inc. v.
State, 679 addressed the meaning of "loss" for purposes of indemnifica-
tion reimbursement. After settling a case with the original complain-
ant in a damages action following a bridge collapse, the state was
awarded indemnification from the party causing the collapse for forty
percent of the settlement cost.680 The court upheld the award and
ruled that, for the purposes of an indemnification provision between
the state and a contractor, "loss" is defined as the settlement cost
rather than the actual value of the property destroyed. 6
81
C. Negligence
A common basis for tort claims is negligence. The cases in the
following section address two of the fundamental issues of negligence,
duty and causation, as well as negligence per se. In Gordon v. Alaska
Pacific Bancorporation,682 the court found that the host of a large
party where alcoholic beverages are freely dispensed may owe his
guests a duty to provide adequate security to protect them against al-
tercations, if a jury finds such altercations to have been reasonably
foreseeable by the host.683 In addition, the court addressed the "good
samaritan" aspect of protective care.684 Afirming the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,685 the court found that liability may be imposed if
674. Koehring Mfg. v. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, 763 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1988).
675. 763 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1988).
676. Id. at 504.
677. Id. at 504-08.
678. Id. at 509.
679. 761 P.2d 718 (Alaska 1988).
680. Id. at 719.
681. Id. at 720.
682. 753 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1988).
683. Id. at 723.
684. Id. at 724.
685. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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an individual, in undertaking to protect another, fails to exercise rea-
sonable care and as a result increases the risk of harm or causes harm
to be suffered as a result of detrimental reliance on his protective
efforts. 686
The oourt again addressed the necessity of finding a duty before
imposing negligence liability in Estate of Breitenfeld v. Air-Tek, Inc. 687
A widow brought suit against an electrical repair company for the
wrongful death of her husband in an airplane crash due to a defective
ceiling detection light.688 Because the company had no contract with
the airport and had merely agreed to order a replacement when the
light was found to be inoperable, the court held that it had not "volun-
tarily assumed to perform a particular act" giving rise to a duty and
therefore affirmed the lower court's summary dismissal of the claim.689
Negligence per se is found where a tortfeasor's violation of a stat-
utory provision results in injury to the plaintiff.6 90 In West v. Munici-
pality of Anchorage,691 a driver moving thirty miles per hour hit and
killed a pedestrian. The statutory speed limit in Anchorage is twenty
miles per hour "unless otherwise posted. ' 692 The court held that
whether a thirty-five-miles-per-hour sign posted just before the turnoff
to the road on which the accident occurred was "otherwise posted" so
as to negate liability was a question of fact properly posed to the
jury.69 3
McCarthy v. McCarthy694 also involved an automobile accident
and addressed the issues of negligence and causation. Two cars col-
lided as one was leaving and the other was entering a parking lot.695
The lower court, while finding both drivers negligent, held that the
defendant's negligence was not the legal cause of the accident. 696
However, because the departing car did not stop before pulling into
686. Gordon, 753 P.2d at 724.
687. 755 P.2d 1099 (Alaska 1988).
688. Id. at 1100. A ceiling detection light is a beacon that measures the cloud
cover over an airport. Id.
689. Id. at 1101-03.
690. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON, ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 229-30 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
691. 754 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1988).
692. 13 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, ADMIN. CODE § 02.275(b) (eff. before 7/28/59;
am. 6/28/79).
693. West, 754 P.2d at 1122.
694. 753 P.2d 137 (Alaska 1988).
695. Id. at 137.
696. Id.
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the street, the supreme court found that the defendant's action satis-
fied both the "but for" and "substantial factor" tests of causation697
and overturned the lower court's finding that his action was not a legal
cause.
698
A major decision in 1988 will affect attempts to impose negli-
gence liability on design professionals. In Turner Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Scales, 699 the court held unconstitutional the six-year statute of
repose on suits against design professionals. 7°° The statute provides
that no action for damages may be brought against such professionals
"more than six years after substantial completion of an improve-
ment. ' 70 1 In Turner, a contractor was sued for negligent construction
and installation of a fireplace. 702 The court affirmed the lower court's
ruling that the suit could not be barred by the statute of repose.70 3
The court found that the statute violated the equal protection clause of
the Alaska Constitution7°4 because the means were neither substan-
tially nor rationally related to the ends: "[T]here is no substantial re-
lationship between exempting design professionals from liability,
shifting liability for defective design and construction to owners and
material suppliers, and the goal of encouraging construction. '70 5
D. Libel
The court decided two cases in 1988 in which it set forth the pre-
requisites to a valid claim for libel. For a "public figure" to recover
damages for an allegedly libelous statement, he must show "that the
statement was false and that the false statement was made with 'actual
malice.' ",706 In Rybachek v. Sutton,70 7 the court found that the plain-
tiff, a local columnist and owner of a gold mine, was a public figure
under the United States Supreme Court's definition, which includes
"any individual who 'voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a par-
ticular public controversy' thereby 'engag[ing] the public's attention in
an attempt to influence its outcome.' ",708 However, the court affirmed
697. Id. at 138. The "but for" test requires that the accident would not have oc-
curred but for the event in question. The "substantial factor" test means that reason-
able men would view the event as a cause and attach liability. Id.
698. Id. at 139.
699. 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
700. Id. at 472; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983).
701. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983).
702. Turner, 752 P.2d at 469.
703. Id. at 472.
704. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
705. Turner, 752 P.2d at 472.
706. Rybachek v. Sutton, 761 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Alaska 1988). See Moffatt v.
Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 941 (Alaska 1988).
707. 761 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1988).
708. Id. at 1014 (quoting Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
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the lower court's judgment against the plaintiff because the plaintiff
produced no proof that the defendant's actions violated the "actual
malice" standard.70 9
The malice standard was more fully discussed in an earlier deci-
sion, Moffatt v. Brown,710 in which the court reaffirmed the requisite
mental state for a finding of malice in libel actions as reckless disre-
gard sufficient to permit the inference that the defendant "subjectively
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statement. 711 More
importantly, perhaps, in Moffatt, the court declined to follow the
United States Supreme Court's standard for summary judgment in li-
bel cases, enunciated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,71 2 of whether
the evidence supports a finding "that the plaintiff has shown actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has
not. '713 On the grounds that Anderson was "a case about federal pro-
cedure," the court instead elected to continue its own standard for
denial of motions for summary judgment that "a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists to be litigated." 71 4 The court's reasoning was based
on the belief that the Anderson standard requires a weighing of the
evidence by the judge, a function which intrudes into the province of
the jury.715
E. Miscellaneous Tort Issues
The court decided several issues of first impression in 1988 in var-
ious areas of tort law. Doe v. Colligan,71 6 a civil sexual abuse case,
addressed for the first time the question whether punitive damages
may be recovered from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. The court
joined a majority of states in holding that recovery of punitive dam-
ages is not permitted.717 Given that punitive damages are intended
both to punish the wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent to future
tortious conduct, the court reasoned that the beneficial effect of these
elements would be lost if the tortfeasor were deceased. 718
In 1987, the court recognized, for the first time, a minor child's
cause of action for loss of parental consortium resulting from tortious
709. Id. at 1014-15.
710. 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988).
711. Id. at 942 (quoting Green v. Northern Publishing Co., 655 P.2d 736, 742
(Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983)) (emphasis deleted).
712. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
713. Moffatt, 751 P.2d at 942 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255-56 (1986)).
714. Id. at 943-44; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 56(c).
715. Moffatt, 751 P.2d at 944.
716. 753 P.2d 144 (Alaska 1988).
717. Id. at 146.
718. Id. at 145.
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injury to a parent in Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc. 719 In an
effort to further protect the interests of minors, in the 1988 case of
Truesdell v. Halliburton Co., Inc. 720 the court established that the stat-
ute of limitations for such claims was not tolled until the child reaches
the age of majority, at which point it will extend for two years.721 The
court recognized, however, that full retroactivity would have strong
implications with respect to potential double recoveries and the re-
opening of closed cases and, therefore, opted for limited retroactiv-
ity.722 Thus, in any case where at least one parent has brought an
action for damages related to an accident which has been the subject
of a judgment or final settlement, the minor's claim will be barred.723
The court also addressed the prerequisities to a valid claim for the
tort of abuse of process in Kollodge v. State. 724 In the plaintiff's abuse
of process action against the state's attorney arising from an earlier
proceeding, the court cited the two elements which comprise the tort:
an ulterior purpose and a willful act not proper in the regular conduct
of the judicial process.725 Because the plaintiff never pleaded that any
willful act had been taken by the state, the court recognized that the
filing of suit, in and of itself, is not enough to support the cause of
action, and it affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the claim.
726
Finally, the court decided two cases concerning the discovery rule
and statutes of limitation. In Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles,727
which involved a construction worker's products liability claim for the
defective design of a safety helmet, the court rejected the contention
that the two-year statute of limitations should have been tolled until
the plaintiff discovered actual evidence supporting his claim.
728
Rather, the court held that the statutory period commences to run
when "a reasonable person would have notice of facts 'sufficient to
prompt a person of average prudence to inquire,' and thus [the person]
should be deemed to have notice of all facts which reasonable inquiry
would disclose."'729 Therefore, the statute would begin to run at the
time of the injury or, in this case, as soon as the plaintiff regained his
719. 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
720. 754 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1988).
721. Id. at 238. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1983).
722. Truesdell, 754 P.2d at 241-42.
723. Id. at 242.
724. 757 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1988).
725. Id. at 1026, (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 291, § 121, at 898).
726. Id. at 1027-28.
727. 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988).
728. Id. at 291-92.
729. Id. at 292 (quoting Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 376
(Alaska 1987)(quoting Vigil v. Spokane County, 42 Wash. App. 796, 714 P.2d 692,
695 (1986)).
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competence thereafter. 730 Holding that the claim was necessarily
time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations,731 the court re-
versed the lower court's denial of summary judgment and rejected the
claim altogether.732
In answering a question certified by the federal district court, the
court declared that the discovery rule, while applicable to tort causes
of action, would not extend to contract claims for breach of warranty
in Armour v. Alaska Power Authority.733 While claims for breach of
warranty do carry a four-year statute of limitations,734 the statutory
period begins to run on the date the product is purchased and not on
the date the injury occurs. 735 Although an exception is permitted in
cases where the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance,"
in this case the goods were purchased with an implied warranty. 736
Therefore, a person claiming to have been injured by a defective good
may instead assert a tort claim within two years of the date of
injury. 737
Caroline F Bergman
Gregg R. Melinson
730. Id. at 292.
731. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
732. Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 293.
733. 765 P.2d 1372 (Alaska 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.318 (1986) (warranty
protection).
734. ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.725(a) (1986).
735. Armour, 765 P.2d 1375; ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.725(b) (1986).
736. Armour, 765 P.2d at 1374.
737. Id. at 1375.
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